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Introduction
In a competitive economic world, it is often the case that businesses fail and become
insolvent.
1
If insolvent businesses are not protected by a specialized legal system, the
creditors of the debtor will break the businesses up by liquidating them on the auction
block according to the traditional non-bankruptcy law. If a business is liquidated, the value
of the business as a productive whole will be lost; the workers and the managers are likely
to lose their jobs. The creditors may find that the liquidation value of the debtor's assets is
insufficient to repay more than a fraction of their claims; unsecured creditors will often
receive nothing. If the creditors are not paid in full in liquidation, there will be nothing left
for the equity shareholders. The destruction of value caused by business liquidation will
accordingly reduce the total wealth of society. Keeping a failing business in operation,
therefore, will often be, economically and socially, much more efficient and desirable than
liquidating it.
For this reason, most legal regimes have their own legal rules dealing with the
consequences of business failures even though the rules do not necessarily constitute a
1
There are two kinds of insolvency: "balance sheet" insolvency and "equity" insolvency. A debtor is
insolvent in the balance sheet sense if the sum of the debtor's debts exceeds the value of the debtor's assets.
A debtor is insolvent in the "equity" sense if the debtor is unable to pay its debts as they become due
regardless of the debtor's ability to pay. In this article, the term "insolvency" is used in the balance sheet
sense, unless otherwise identified.
2
In addition, the loss of jobs causes additional social costs such as increased unemployment insurance
payments and decreased tax revenues. Although it is possible that other business entities with similar
positions may eventually employ all or part of the workers and managers, this does not happen immediately,
and it is not cost-free. In the long run, society will pay a price for the liquidation of a business. This view is
formal bankruptcy system. 3 In 1978 Congress promulgated the United States Bankruptcy
Code,4 which is also based on the premise that reorganization is often more desirable and
economical than liquidation. When Congress created Chapter 1 1 of the Code, 5 it
envisioned that financially distressed businesses could use Chapter 1 1 as a tool to
reorganize and to continue their operations as a viable concern. The House committee
report emphasized that "[t]he purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a
liquidation, is to restructure a business 's finances so that it may continue to operate,
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its
stockholders."
6
However, business rehabilitation is not cost-free. First, the debtor needs additional
resources to emerge from financial distress and continue its business as a viable concern.
Before filing a bankruptcy petition, the debtor may have scaled back its operation and
undertaken other internal restructuring, but may be failing nonetheless. It cannot increase
cash flow any further from internal restructuring. Resources necessary for the debtor to
survive then can only be obtained through an external infusion of capital. In most cases,
except the rare cases where the security equity holders invest new capital, there are no
sources other than the creditors that can bear the risks of new capital infusion. 7 Under the
called the "Social Benefit View." Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy Thermodynamics, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 329, 359
(1998).
3
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 344 (1993).
4 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter the "Code"].
5
1 1 U.S.C. Sections 101 -1329 (1994).
6
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 215 (1977).
7 Most of the economic resources necessary for debtor rehabilitation and the administration of a case are
obtained in exchange for creditors' losses For example, the allowance of cross-collateral places financial
risks on creditors. Case law shows that "major protections for secured and unsecured creditors in
bankruptcy are being limited so that creditors can be forced involuntarily to infuse resources into troubled
firms." Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy Thermodynamics, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 329, 332 (1998). Such resource
infusion is made possible by deviating from creditors' expectations of their legal rights, either by changing
contracts or limiting the creditors' rights established under non-bankruptcy law. Id. The "automatic stay,"
Code, most such economic resources can, therefore, be obtained in exchange for
creditors' losses. For example, discharge relieves the debtor of future financial burdens in
exchange for creditors' financial losses, including the principal of the loan and its
interest.
8 Second, the administration of the case also involves costs. These costs include
legal, accounting, investment banking, and debtor in possession fees and expenses. The
administrative costs, which should be paid prior to secured credits, reduce the debtor's
assets that would otherwise be available for distribution to the creditors. The total amount
of these bankruptcy-related costs averages 10 to 20 percent of the debtor's prepetition
value.
9
If a reorganization case ends up in success, keeping the debtor in operation as a viable
concern, such costs eventually born by the creditors can be justified to some extent
because the costs were contributed to promote social benefit. 10 The reorganization
scheme presupposes that the creditors' economic loss and attendant misuse of resources
are inevitable for the purpose of debtor rehabilitation. The Supreme Court also recognizes
the same consequence, stating that "[t]he fundamental purpose of reorganization is to
which was designed to give the debtor a breathing spell, also incurs lost opportunity costs to certain
creditors. See, e.g., United Savings Association v. Timbers oflnwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365
(1988) (holding that an undersecured creditor is not entitled to the compensation for its inability to seize
and sell collateral). In Timbers, the Supreme Court held that an undersecured creditor is not entitled to the
compensation for its inability to seize and sell collateral.
8
Hon. Howard Schwartzberg, Evaluating the Chapter 11 Process, 18 Westchester BJ. 15, 22-23 (1991).
See generally Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy Thermodynamics, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 329 (1998).
Franks. J.R. and W.N. Torous, A Comparison of Financial Restructuring in Distress Exchanges and
Chapter 11 Reorganization, Journal of Financial Economics (June, 1994), 349-370.
10 See generally, Lewis, supra note 8, at 359-64. Under the "social benefit view," business reorganization
law has a special role distinct from that of state law, which is designed primarily to protect the creditors'
interests. Id. at 359. The goals of bankruptcy reorganization law, while protecting creditors' interests,
should also include enhancing or at least preserving the value of a debtor; protecting certain parties
considered socially worth protecting, such as employees; establishing a means to collectivize debt
collection; and determining how to allocate the debtor's existing value. Id. at 359-60. See also Douglas G.
Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815,
816 (calling the "social benefit view" the "traditional view" of bankruptcy policy).
prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible
misuse of economic resources.
If. however, the reorganization efforts fail to make the debtor emerge from financial
distress, the time and money spent on the administration of the case would be considered
merely wasted. The creditors must nonetheless bear such costs. The loss born by the
creditors would, theoretically, be the difference between the liquidation value at the time
of filing and the value actually distributed to the creditors group after the unsuccessful
reorganization efforts. The amount of the costs incurred by a failing reorganization is up
to 10 to 20 percent of the debtor's prepetition assets. Moreover, according to an empirical
study, fewer than 30 percent 1 " of the cases filing for reorganization relief culminated in
success.
13
Indeed, the costs incurred by failing reorganizations and born by the creditors
group are significant enough to damage not only the creditors but also the public trust in
bankruptcy reorganization law. 14 Creditor protection becomes much more crucial in cases
where the reorganization efforts end up in vain. 1
11
N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).
12
According to the case statistics of the Executive Officer for the U.S. Trustee (EOUSTj. among the
Chapter 1 1 cases of all sizes filed in 15 judicial districts from 1989 through 1995. fewer than 30 percent of
the cases resulted in a confirmed plan of reorganization. David P. Bart & Scott Peltz. Rethinking the
Concept of "Success" in Bankruptcy and Corporate Recover}. 17-May Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 1. 34 | 1998).
13
This thesis considers a reorganization case to be successful if a plan of reorganization has been
confirmed, unless otherwise specified. If "success" is defined as the achievement of the results sought or the
avoidance of negative results, by the debtor at the time of filing, the success rate for Chapter 1 1 cases is
different. Reorganization cases voluntarily dismissed after the debtor achieved its goals in filing average
approximately 40 percent of the reorganization cases surveyed. Hon. Samuel L. Bufford. What is Right
About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics. 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 829, 833 (1994). For various
definitions of success, see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford. Patterns in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large. Publicly Held Companies. 78 Cornell L. Rev. 597. 599-600 ( 1993).
14 Some commentators suggest the abolition of the reorganization scheme in its entirety. E.g.. Barry E.
Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation. 11 Cornell L. Rev. 439 (1992); Michael Bradley & Michael
Rosenweig. The Untenable Case for Chapter 11. 101 Yale L.J. 1043 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy
Case for Corporate Reorganization. 15 J. Legal Stud. 127 (1986); John D. Aver. Chapter 11: Uses and
Consequences. 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 493, 493 (1996). However, many commentators maintain that
Chapter 1 1 of the Code is necessary because even businesses troubled enough to file for bankruptcy often
This thesis attempts to discover the factors leading to such failures and to propose a cure.
It argues that the basic structure of Chapter 1 1 of the Code, the debtor in possession
structure, is one of the essential factors causing such a high rate of failure. The thesis
further asserts that it is possible to reduce the rate of unsuccessful reorganization if the
bankruptcy court exercises its power of case management more actively and
expeditiously.
16
For example, the court can screen the debtors' filing for relief before the
reorganization case proceeds too far. The court can also order the appointment of a trustee
unless it is convinced that such an appointment is useless. The debtor screening role of
the court, if exercised appropriately, can prevent debtors that are not worth reorganizing
from coming into the process, reducing the costs considerably. Appointment of a trustee,
on the other hand, removes improper management while keeping viable businesses in
operation, thereby also reducing the costs.
Chapter II of this thesis examines the basic structure of Chapter 1 1 of the Code, the
debtor in possession construct, to discover the factors leading cases to failure. This
chapter argues that most of the failing cases have resulted from problems connected to the
debtor in possession structure. In the ordinary course of events in most Chapter 1 1 cases,
while the debtor continues to operate its business and manage its property as an entity
known as the debtor in possession, its creditors suffer, for example, a lack of necessary
have a going concern value worth saving. Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish
Chapter 11? The Evidence From Japan, 23 J. Legal Stud. 1 1 1, 154 (1994).
1
In cases where reorganization efforts fail, it would be difficult to explain why creditors and other
members of society should forgive nonpaying debtors. Creditors and other members of society forgive
nonpaying debtors in order to rehabilitate the debtors. See generally Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness:
Rebalancing Bankruptcy System 4 (1997). See also Susan Block-Lieb, A Humanistic Vision ofBankruptcy
Law, 6 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 471 (1998).
16
This view emphasizing the bankruptcy courts' active role in the administration of a case is called the
traditionalist's view, as compared to the proceduralist's view, which focuses on procedure and the function
information about the debtor's financial conditions. Moreover, they are often apathetic to
the reorganization of the debtor because of, in part, the relatively high cost of
participation compared to their claims. Under Chapter 1 1, the debtor in possession not
only exercises its wide discretion in operating the business, but also enjoys the exclusive
right to propose a plan for at least 120 days.
17 As a result, the debtor in possession has
many incentives to take advantage of the process, such as abuses of the automatic stay
and other strategies delaying the process. That, to some extent, explains why so many
businesses filing for reorganization relief fail to reorganize or fail to survive the financial
difficulties even after the plan has been confirmed.
Chapter HI discusses the provisions restricting such discretion of the debtor in
possession. Under the Code, there are several institutional devices restricting the debtor in
possession's seemingly absolute discretion. They include the court's powers
administrating the case and limiting the discretion of the debtor in possession; 18 the
creditors' committee and the United States Trustee monitoring the debtor in possession; 19
and the potential of the appointment of a trustee or an examiner. In addition, a debtor in
possession is a fiduciary for the creditors of the estate; 20 therefore, it has a duty to
preserve and protect the assets of the estate21 while prosecuting the case expeditiously.
Among the restricting methods, Chapter III deals mainly with the mandatory creditors'
of a vibrant market economy in reorganization law. See generally, Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's
Uncontested Axioms, 108 Yale L. Rev. 573 (1998).
17
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 121(b) (1994).
18
See 11 U.S.C. Section 1107(a); 5 Collier on Bankruptcy^ 1 107.1-1 107.3 (Lawrence P. King et al. Eds.,
15
th
ed. 1991); In re McClure, 69 B.R. 282, 289-90 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987).
19
1 1 U.S.C. Sections 1 102, 1 103 (1994).
20
See, e.g., In re Sharon Steel Corp., 86 B.R. 455 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
21
In re Russell, 60 B.R. 42, 47 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1985).
22
committee and the fiduciary duties of the debtor in possession. Other restricting methods
will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.
Promulgating the Code in 1978, Congress thought the mandatory unsecured creditors'
committee would curb the debtor in possession's powerful discretion. However, the
creditors' committee has proved to be an inadequate safeguard. In order to achieve a
balance between the debtor and its creditors and to make the reorganization procedure
more efficient and fair, Congress granted the bankruptcy courts a stronger equity power
than ever by revising Section 105 of the Code in 1986 and again in 1994. The purpose of
the revisions was to eliminate the possibility of the debtor's stratagems damaging the
creditors.
The bankruptcy courts' strong equity powers along with other statutory powers are the
issues discussed in Chapter IV. Under the Code, the bankruptcy court is limited to its
judicial functions, leaving the case management task to the United States Trustee.
However, subsequent to the Code's promulgation in 1978, the need for the court's active
participation in the process has been called for. Accordingly, the court's decisions have
recognized, for example, the debtor screening function of the court, such as the good faith
filing requirement. Other methods testing the debtor's eligibility for reorganization
include, among others, creditors' relief from the stay23 and the conversion and dismissal
of a case for "cause."
24
These methods will, if exercised appropriately, prevent debtors
not deserving reorganization from continuing futile yet expensive reorganization efforts,
thereby reducing unnecessary costs. In addition, the court can order the appointment of a
21
In re Van Brunt, 46 B.R. 29, 30 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984).
23
1 1 U.S.C. Section 362(d) (1994).
24
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 1 12(b) (1994).
trustee or an examiner. If appointed, the trustee normally replaces the debtor in
possession and can redress the problems caused by the current management. An
examiner, on the other hand, can help the court and creditors make appropriate decisions
by giving them necessary information about the debtor's management and financial
conditions.
Chapter V of the thesis discusses the roles of the trustee and the examiner in the
reorganization process. A trustee replaces the debtor in possession, managing the day-to-
day operation of the debtor, and investigates the debtor's management and financial
situations with expertise, thereby helping the creditors and the court make appropriate
decisions. It is often difficult to recognize the viability of a business apart from the
management, especially in closely held small businesses. 25 Therefore, the removal of
incompetent or dishonest management, for instance, is crucial for the success of a
reorganization case. It is likewise often the case that the appointment of a trustee brings
about the conversion of the reorganization case to a Chapter 7 liquidation case. This
implies either that the debtor should have been liquidated earlier or at least that the prior
management was inappropriate to manage the business.
Chapter VI concludes that if the bankruptcy courts more actively exercise their equity
power or discretion, the costs that creditors and the society eventually have to pay will
decrease dramatically. Taking into consideration the results that failing cases would bring
about, it is obvious that nonviable debtors and those abusing the automatic stay should be
eliminated at an early stage of the procedure.
See generally Donald R. Korobkin, Vulnerability, Survival, and the Problem of Small Business
Chapter I
The Basic Structure of Chapter 11
A. Balancing Conflicting Interests
The Chapter 1 1 process represents "a remarkable conciliation of interests.'" In a
reorganization case, for example, the debtor has an interest in its own effective
rehabilitation,
27
while its creditors have an interest in the recovery of their claims in
proportion to the recovery of other creditors. A successful reorganization of the debtor
is, in this context, directly connected to those of its managers, officers, and other
employees as well as its equity shareholders. These interests are often contradictory;
creditors' recovery against the debtor may, as a matter of course, detrimentally affect the
possibility of successful debtor rehabilitation, for example. Chapter 1 1 attempts to
reconcile these competing interests in a balanced manner under specialized collection
rules.
In promulgating Chapter 1 1 of the Code in 1978, Congress intended to balance these
two competing interests of the parties by giving them an arena in which the parties
negotiate and bargain. Therefore, whatever the eventual outcome of the bargain, the
debtor and its creditors themselves ultimately determine the deployment of the assets of
Bankruptcy, 23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 413 (1994).
26
Brian Leepson, A Case for the Use ofa Broad Court Equity Power to Facilitate Chapter 11
Reorganization, 12 Bankr. Dev. J. 775, 775 (1996).
27
See, e.g., United States v. Voile Elec, Inc. {In re Voile Elec, Inc.), 139 B.R. 451, 453 (1992).
28
See, e.g., In re Whitman, 101 B.R. 37, 38 (1989). Creditors in general are not necessarily interested in
maximizing the debtor's viability. Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: a New Modelfor Corporate
10
the estate and produce the plan.
29
Chapter 1 1 adopted the idea that, with appropriate
oversight and an effective committee of creditors, the debtor itself would be best suited to
reorganizing the failing business. With the leading role assigned to the debtor in
possession, Chapter 1 1 devised the mandated statutory committee of unsecured creditors.
The committee is the primary counterpart to the DIP, having the right and duty to
negotiate a reorganization plan with the DIP. Chapter 1 1 is thus based on the assumption
that the dynamics between the creditors' committee and the DIP would produce the
necessary resources and incentive to effect the efficient and successful reorganization of
the debtor.
Under Chapter 1 1, while the DIP and its creditors negotiate and bargain over a
reorganization plan, the bankruptcy court, by and large, loosely oversees the lengthy
bargaining process. In principle, the court cannot be actively involved in the
administration of the cases. Rather, the court's role is limited to that of an adjudicator of
actual controversies requiring judicial intervention. Reorganizations are not assumed
primarily to be the outcome of the judicial process, but reflect the persuasive power in
the negotiation process held by the disputing parties themselves. As a result, the role of
the bankruptcy court or the judge can be reduced to that of a bystander if the negotiating
parties mutually agree on the terms of the reorganization plan.
31
Congress thought that the
dynamics between the DIP and creditors, but not the court, would work best in balancing
Reorganization, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 542 (1983).
29
See 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1121 et seq. J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 Am. Bankr. L.J.
213,
256(1991).
30
Peter F. Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 301,
348(1982).
31
J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 213, 215 (1991).
11
the competing interests, thereby achieving the policies underlying Chapter 1 1 of the
Code.
Unexpectedly, however, since 1978, the need for efficiency in Chapter 1 1 cases has
called for the court's more active involvement in the administration of the cases. This
trend has arisen partly because creditors were often apathetic in overseeing the DIP. The
bankruptcy court thus had to participate in the process actively in order to complement
the creditors' supervisory deficiencies. In United Savings Association v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.,32 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
stated that bankruptcy judges are, to a certain extent, required to be involved in the
management of Chapter 1 1 cases:
Early and ongoing judicial management of Chapter 1 1 cases is essential if the Chapter 1
1
process is to survive and if the goals of reorganizability on the one hand, and creditor
protection, on the other, are to be achieved. In almost all cases the key to avoiding excessive
administrative costs, which are borne by the unsecured creditors, as well as excessive interest
expense, which is borne by all creditors, is early and stringent judicial management of the
case. We recognize that Congress, in 1978, amended the bankruptcy laws with the intention
of removing bankruptcy judges from the administration of the debtor's estate. The purpose of
this amendment was to insure the impartiality of the bankruptcy judges. We do not believe,
however, that Congress thereby intended to relieve the bankruptcy judge of the responsibility
of managing the cases before him in such a way to promote the objectives and goals of the
Bankruptcy Code. 33
Beside the court's role in case management to expedite the process and reduce the
costs, the abuse of the process by the DIP calls for the court's active participation in the
process. According to an empirical study, 34 corporate managers, in most cases surveyed,
abused bankruptcy law to protect their positions and the wealth of the insider
32
In re Timbers ofInwood Forest Associates, Ltd. 808 F.2d 363 (5
th
Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
33
Id. at 373 (footnotes omitted).
34
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale L.J. 1043 (1992).
12
shareholders of a corporation.
35 Even though what the study shows may not be a universal
phenomenon and leaves "large areas of uncertainty and contention," it sheds some
important light on the cost and effectiveness of business reorganization. The study
demonstrates how much the DIP structure of Chapter 1 1 is susceptible to abuse by the
debtor's management.
As discussed above, the basic scheme of Chapter 1 1 is analogous to the civil
adversary system.
37 The goals of the adversary system are to discover the facts (in
reorganization cases the "facts" can be "value maximization") on which the dispute is
based and, if appropriate, redress losses. The system relies upon two fundamental
attributes: party control and an independent decision-maker. 39 Under the system, the
parties weave the process out of their actions and responses, with the expectation that a
vigorous interchange (the "interchange" is analogous to "negotiation" in reorganization
cases) between them will lead to an optimal result.40 The traditional decision-maker, the
court, instead remains relatively passive.41 In order for the adversary system to succeed,
the adversaries should be equally able to obtain information and to present the case to the
court.
42
In reorganization cases, however, the creditors are many in number, and their
interests are diverse. They are often apathetic to the case and, more importantly, unable to
35
Id. at 1076.
36
Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate Reorganization: A Reply to Bradley and
Rosenweig, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 669, 735 (1993).
7
The adversary system is a principle deeply rooted in Anglo-American law and originated from the
concepts of ordeal, battle, and wager of law. Zipes, infra note 38, at 1 1 1 3 & n. 14.
8 Greg M. Zipes, Discovery Abuse in the Civil Adversary System: Looking to Bankruptcy's Regime of
Mandatory Disclosure and Third Party Control over the Discovery Process for Solutions, 27 Cumb. L.
Rev. 1107, 11 12 (1996-1997) n. 13.
i9
Id, at 1112.
40
See id.
41
See id.
42
Id. at 1113.
13
obtain needed information about the financial or economic situation of the debtor. In
contrast, under the DIP structure of Chapter 11, in which the controlling power in
reorganization is assigned to the DIP, the DIP can exercise its wide discretion while
operating the ordinary businesses of the debtor and making bankruptcy decisions. The
wide discretion of the DIP and unbalanced access to information are the main factors that
often lead a case to failure and as a result waste time and money.
B. The Debtor in Possession Construct and Its Efficiency
1 . The Debtor in Possession Concept
In most Chapter 1 1 cases, the debtor, as DIP, remains in possession of the business
and continues to oversee operation of the ongoing business.43 Bankruptcy courts also
have recognized a strong presumption that the debtor is entitled to remain in possession
of the estate.
44
In addition to operating the business, the DIP retains the exclusive right to
propose a reorganization plan for at least 120 days after the commencement of the case.45
The DIP retains significant control over both the business and the reorganization of the
business.
With respect to legal status or entity, the DIP is regarded as the same entity as the
debtor.
46
In other words, the DIP is the preexisting debtor with modified rights and
43
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 107 (1994).
See, e.g.. Committee ofDalcon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d 239 (4 th Cir. 1987).
4
-
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 121(a)(b) (1994).
The courts' opinions have been divided on whether the DIP is a separate entity or the same entity as the
debtor. Recently, courts' decisions seem to reject the "separate entity theory" at least as a universally
applicable concept. See In re Chapel Gate Apartments, Ltd., 64 Bankr. 569, 576 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986);
N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984); In re Triangle Chemicals, Inc., 697 F.2d 1280,
1290 (5
th
Cir. 1983); In re Unishops, Inc., 543 F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally Stephen
McJohn, Claims & Opinions: Person or Property? On the Legal Nature of the Bankruptcy Estate, 10
Bankr. Dev. J. 465(1994).
14
obligations. Section 1101(1) defines the DIP as the debtor unless a trustee has been
appointed,
47
and Section 101(12) defines the debtor as "the person or municipality
concerning which" a Chapter 1 1 case has been filed.
48
In the question of who controls the
business and the direction of the proceedings, the DIP refers to the management of the
business including managers, directors, and other officers.
49
2. Historical Background
Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, a DIP was allowed only in small
businesses. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,50 reorganization law included two
different forms of relief: Chapter X and Chapter XI. Chapter XI had a relatively simple
procedure for restructuring unsecured debts, primarily intended for use by smaller
businesses.
51 Under Chapter XI, the current managers, often the owners of the business,
retained control of the company and had substantial autonomy in operating the business
and creating the terms of a reorganization plan. In contrast, Chapter X was intended for
use by corporations with more complex capital structures. 52 It represented a more
complicated procedure, which restricted the influence of former management and
afforded substantial protections to the creditors both in the administration of the estate
47
See 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 101(1) (1994).
48
See id. Section 101(12).
49 Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties,
Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 Bankr. Dev. J. 1, 21 (1989).
50 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed in 1978) [hereinafter the "Act"].
51 House Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Law Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95 th Cong., 1 SI Sess. 222
(1977) [hereinafter House Report].
52
Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973).
15
and in the formulation of a plan. 53 Under Chapter X, a trustee was always appointed,
replacing the current management. The trustee had broad powers to investigate past fraud
and mismanagement in addition to the power to operate the business. 54 In 1978, Congress
unified the aspects of Chapter X and XI of the Act into Chapter 1 1 of the Code. 55 Chapter
1 1 of the Code adopted the rule of Chapter XI, which generally allowed corporate
managers to remain in possession of the business and have the right to formulate a plan.
This ability of management to retain control of the business during a reorganization
case is part of an effort to increase the effectiveness of the reorganization under Chapter
1 1 . When Congress promulgated this Chapter, it presumed that managers were basically
honest, competent, and familiar with the business and its constituencies, which in general
made them more qualified than a trustee in operating the business. 56 Congress also
thought that the rule requiring appointment of a trustee in Chapter X cases brought about
undesirable results. Managers of larger corporations, losing confidence in remaining in
their positions, often tried to file for bankruptcy relief under Chapter XI instead of
Chapter X, or delayed filing for relief altogether until the corporation lost its viability and
therefore became unable to reorganize. 57 By allowing managers to remain in control of
the business under Chapter 1 1 , Congress wanted to encourage managers to file for
bankruptcy reorganization earlier while the business was viable and thus offer the failing
business a better chance for survival. Moreover, some commentators have suggested that
even the creditors will often prefer to deal with managers they are familiar with in order
53 Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X and
XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 Yale L.J. 1334, 1338 (1939).
54
Id.
5 The Code also reflects aspects of Chapter XII of the Act, which was applied to real property
arrangements of non-corporate debtors. House Report, supra note 51, at 223-24.
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to save the time and expenses necessary to educate a trustee or other third party about the
CO
business and the problems involved.
3. Roles of the Debtor in Possession
Upon commencement of proceedings for reorganization under Chapter 1 1 of the
Code, current management continues to operate its business as a DIP unless a trustee is
appointed.
59
For most purposes, the managers of the business control.
60 With some
exceptions,
61
the DIP has all the rights and powers, and performs all the functions and
duties, of a trustee appointed in a case under the Code. " Unlike a trustee, however, there
is a strong presumption in favor of the DIP continuing to operate the business unless
management is incompetent or dishonest. The DIP thus not only continues the ongoing
operation of the business, but it also is the driving force behind the negotiation and
formulation of the reorganization plan.
64
The DIP continues to engage in the transactions that arise in the ordinary course of the
debtor's business unless the bankruptcy court orders otherwise.65 The transactions include
56
Id. at 233.
57
Id. at 233-34.
58 See Peter F. C
Bills, 30 Bus. L., 1 149, 1 156 (1974).
, oogan et ai. Comments on Some Reorganization Provisions of the Pending Bankruptcy
59
1 1 U.S.C. Sections 1 104(a), 1 107(a) (1994). See also WWG Industries, Inc. v. United Textiles, Inc. (In re
WWG Industries, Inc.), 772 F.2d 810, 811 (11 th Cir. 1985) (upon the filing of the Chapter 1 1 petition, the
debtor obtains the title "debtor-in-possession").
60
For purposes of this thesis, both the officers and the directors are considered to be part of the
management of the debtor. Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 49, at 21 (describing management as "the
officers, directors, retained professionals and business managers").
61
The exceptions are related principally to the right to compensation and the investigative functions of a
trustee. See 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 107(a) (1994). See also Practising Law Institute, Reorganization Under the
Bankruptcy Code-Chapter J
1
, 776 PLI/Comm 925, 928 (1998).
62
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 107(a) (1994). The Code prescribes a trustee's rights, powers, and duties first and
then, for convenience, quotes the provisions regarding a trustee to the DIP.
63
See, e.g.. In re Ford, 36 B.R. 501 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
64 Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter II Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73
B.U.L. Rev. 581,592(1993).
65
1 1 U.S.C. Section 363(c)(1) (1994).
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the use, sale, or lease of the property of the estate.
66 Only those actions arising outside the
ordinary course of business require the bankruptcy court's approval in advance. A DIP's
business decisions, if they are based on the exercise of rational business judgment, will
not be intervened.
67 Under the business judgment test, a DIP will be found to have
exercised proper business judgment when its act involves a business judgment made in
/TO
good faith on a reasonable basis, within the scope of its authority. Keeping the business
in operation is essential for the debtor in reorganizing the business successfully because it
gives the DIP time to reorganize and preserves the going concern value of the business
while the case lasts.
In addition to engaging in the day-to-day business, the DIP has rights and powers
related to enhancing or preserving the value of the bankruptcy estate. For instance, parties
holding property of or owing money to the debtor's estate must turn it over to the
debtor,
69
and the DIP may void certain unperfected transfers and transfers for less than
reasonably equivalent value.
70 The DIP may also seek to recover certain payments or
security interests that were made before the bankruptcy filing, on the ground that one
creditor would be unfairly preferred over others. 71 In addition, the DIP may assume and
perform advantageous executory contracts and unexpired leases and may reject those that
are burdensome,72 including collective bargaining agreements.73
66
Id.
67
See, e.g., Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303,131 1 (5 th Cir. 1985) (ruling that
the bankruptcy court did not clearly err by finding that the assumption of the amended lease was a proper
exercise of the debtor's business judgment).
68
In re Southern Biotech, Inc., 37 B.R. 318, 322 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983).
69
11 U.S.C. Section 542 (1994).
70
Id. Sections 544, 548.
71
Id. Section 547.
72 /^.Section 365.
73
Id. Section 1113.
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While continuing to operate the business and enhancing the value of the estate, the
DIP also negotiates the reorganization bargain with its creditors and other participants in
the procedure. In the course of the negotiation, the DIP makes decisions that involve
choices about whether to proceed with the negotiation or liquidate the business. In
addition, the DIP makes decisions about the manner in which the assets and losses of the
business will be allocated. Such decisions should be included in the reorganization plan. 4
The DIP furthermore has the right and power to sell all or part of the assets outside
the ordinary course of business after meeting certain requirements. It has the power to
appoint professionals to perform functions for the estate76 and the standing to sue or be
sued in the same manner as a trustee under Section 323 of the Code. 77 The DIP is also
subject to the duty to disclose the financial condition of the debtor by periodic reporting
to interested parties;
78
the duty to protect and preserve the assets;79 and the duty to
prosecute the case in an expeditious manner.
4. Efficiency of the Debtor in Possession Construct
In designing Chapter 1 1 , Congress recognized the need for the debtor to remain in
control to some degree in order to encourage the debtor to file for bankruptcy relief in
74
Id. Section 1322.
75
Id. Section 363 (b). Under section 363 of the Code, the DIP can sell the assets outside the ordinary course
of business if it has an "articulated business justification," In re Continental Air Lines, 780 F.2d 1223, 1226
(5
th
Cir. 1986), and provides adequate notice to all creditors, and if a hearing is held on the sale.
76
11 U.S.C. Section 327 (1994).
77
Id. Section 323.
78
See 1 1 U.S.C. Section 704(7)(8).
79
See id. Section 704(2); In re Nautilius ofNew Mexico, Inc., 83 B.R. 784, 789 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1988).
80
See 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 106 (1994); In re Van Brunt, 46 B.R. 29, 30 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984)
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time while the business still had a going concern value.
81 The benefits inherent in the DIP
concept were described by Congress:
The public and the creditors will not necessarily be harmed if the debtor is continued in
possession in a reorganization case .... In fact, very often the creditors will be benefited
by continuation of the debtor in possession, both because the expense of a trustee will not
be required, and the debtor, who is familiar with his business, will be better able to operate
it during the reorganization case. A trustee frequently has to take time to familiarize himself
with the business before the reorganization can get under way. Thus, a debtor continued in
possession may lead to a greater likelihood of success in the reorganization.82
The DIP construct is thus based upon the assumption that a debtor can be reorganized
most effectively when the management of the debtor retains control of the business
during a reorganization case. The managers are more likely to attempt to reorganize the
debtor earlier, while the business is still viable and therefore capable of being
reorganized, if they have some confidence in remaining in their positions. 83 The managers
are also expected to be able to control the ongoing operations of the business, utilizing
their experience and contacts.
However, the DIP construct is not free from defects. 84 In general, the DIP construct
has provided a ground for questioning the credibility of the Chapter 1 1 process. Managers
whose conduct likely contributed to and precipitated the debtor's financial difficulties
continue to manage the debtor in bankruptcy. These same individuals, therefore, may not
best be entrusted with protecting the interests of creditors and equity shareholders and
rehabilitating the business they had mismanaged. Indeed, there are reorganization cases
caused by fraudulent, inept, inefficient, and poor management. Nevertheless, Congress, in
81 House Report, supra note 5 1 , at 23 1
.
82 Mat 233.
83 W. at 231.
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designing the 1978 Code, responded that "the need for reorganization of a public
company today often results from simple business reverses, not from any fraud,
dishonesty, or gross mismanagement on the part of the debtor's management."
Obviously, however, there are many businesses whose management has caused such
financial difficulties.
In addition to these problems attributed to the DIP, one could argue that the DIP
concept is flawed because there is no independent party responsible for advancing the
reorganization on an expeditious basis.
86 On this point, some commentators have
contended that the DIP concept has proven to be pragmatically superior to requiring the
appointment of a trustee and in the best interests of rehabilitation and reorganization. 87
Moreover, in the 1994 Amendment, Congress vindicated the DIP concept adopted in
1978 despite such criticism. 88
Real problems arise when a DIP makes decisions about the evaluation of the debtor.
The DIP is often inclined to choose reorganization over liquidation even if the debtor is
unfit for reorganization. Regardless of whether or have been retained after the
commencement of the case or have been newly hired, the management of the DIP would
be apt to exaggerate the viability of the debtor because they want to retain their jobs. If a
DIP elects to reorganize a business that is not economically viable and should be
84
See generally Anne M. Burr, The Unproposed Solution to Chapter 11 Reform: Assessing Management
Responsibility for Business Failures, 25 Cal. W. Int'l L. J. 113 (1994).
85
Id. at 233.
'
86
Barry L. Zaretsky, Symposium on Bankruptcy: Chapter 11 Issues: Trustees and Examiners in Chapter
11, 44 S.C. L. Rev. 907, 909 (1993). "Business reorganization, like firewalking, is best done quickly.
Parties have sharp, inherent conflicts of interest over the conduct of both the business and the case." Lynn
M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: An Agenda for Basic Reform, 69 Am. Bankr. L. J. 573, 574 (1995)
87
Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 Yale L.J. 437, 465-79 (1992)
(contending against the repeal of Chapter 1 1 in the absence of a better alternative).
88
See 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 107(a) (1994).
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liquidated, such reorganization efforts are very likely to be unsuccessful. All the parties in
interest, mostly the creditors, will bear the resulting costs incurred by the useless attempts
of reorganization. Similarly, the DIP will face the difficult task of allocating losses among
the various claimants. It serves as an arbitrator in a zero sum game. Deciding who wins
and loses, the game involves choices between a number of competing interests. For
example, equity holders have the lowest priority in bankruptcy and thus are unlikely to
receive anything in a liquidation. Accordingly, they have a strong incentive to encourage
keeping the business in operation despite economic realities. Unsecured creditors with
lower priority have a similar incentive to prefer reorganization to liquidation. By contrast,
secured creditors are likely to choose the liquidation of the business regardless of whether
the business has a going concern value, because the going concern value of the debtor has
nothing to do with the secured creditors. The secured creditors may nevertheless bear the
costs caused by even a failing reorganization case. Therefore, the most crucial issues
related to unsuccessful reorganization cases would be the following: how to restrict the
DEP's seemingly absolute discretion in operating the business; how to evaluate the
debtor's business without influence of the DIP; and how to access exact information that
is under the control of the DIP.
89
According to the zero sum game, dollars allocated to one group in a reorganization case are lost by
another.
Chapter II
Restricting the Debtor in Possession
There are several sources restricting the DIP's seemingly uncontrollable discretion
and powers. They include the creditors' committee monitoring the DIP; 90 the bankruptcy
court's power limiting the discretion of the DIP; 91 the conversion or dismissal of the
case;
92
the appointment of a trustee or an examiner;93 and the court's order prohibiting the
DIP from operating the business. 94 In addition to these restricting sources, a DIP is a
fiduciary for the estate, including the creditors of the debtor. 95 The fiduciary duty of a
DIP is derived from the fact that a DIP represents the estate. Among the sources
enumerated above, fiduciary duties and the creditors' committee are discussed below,
while others are examined in Chapter IV as part of the courts' roles.
A. Fiduciary Duties
The creation of a DIP engenders new rights, duties, and powers for the debtor, which
are defined by the Code. 96 Section 1 107(a) of the Code places a DIP in the shoes of a
trustee appointed in a case under Chapter 1 1 of the Code in virtually every way. The DIP
90
11 U.S.C. Sections 1102, 1103(1994).
91
See 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 107(a); 5 Collier on Bankruptcy f 1 107.1-1 107.3 (Lawrence P. King et al. Eds.,
15
th
ed. 1991) [hereinafter Collier]; In re McClure, 69 B.R. 282, 289-90 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987).
92
11 U.S.C. Section 1112(1994).
93
Id. Sections 1104-1106.
94
Id. Section 1108.
95
See, e.g., In re Sharon Steel Corp., 86 B.R. 455 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
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therefore must perform the functions and duties, including the fiduciary duty, of a trustee,
with a few exceptions such as investigative duties.
97
"[I]f a debtor remains in possession-
that is, if a trustee is not appointed-the debtor's directors bear essentially the same
fiduciary obligation to creditors and shareholders as would the trustee for a debtor out of
possession .... Indeed, the willingness to leave debtors in possession 'is premised upon
an assurance that the officers and managing employees can be depended upon to carry out
the fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee.'"
98
The term fiduciary duty is generally used to describe a relationship involving
confidence, trust, and good faith.99 The relationship that creates such a fiduciary duty in
the bankruptcy context is built between the DIP and the constituents of the estate. The
DIP owes a fiduciary duty to the bankruptcy estate and all parties who hold an interest in
the estate.
100
In a solvent corporation, the managers owe fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty to the debtor and, in most states, to its shareholders, 101 but not to its creditors. In
contrast, under the DIP concept the directors and managers of the DIP have an expanded
responsibility to all parties that comprise the bankruptcy estate, 102 including the
96
See 11U.S.C. Section 1 107(a) (1994).
97
Id.
98 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) (quoting Wolf v.
Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 651 (1963)).
99
Restatement (second) of Trust Section 2 cmt. B (1959) ("A person in a fiduciary relation to another is
under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relation.").
100
John T. Roache, The Fiduciary Obligation ofa Debtor in Possession, 1993 U. 111. L. Rev. 133, 133
(1993).
1 Deborah A. DeMott Fiduciary Obligation, Agency and Partnership: Duties in Ongoing Business
Relationships , American casebook series, West Publishing Co. (1991) at 4.
102
See, e.g., Henderson v. Buchanan (In re Western World Funding, Inc.), 52 B.R. 743, 763 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1985) (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) ("[When a] corporation is insolvent, [a
manager's legal] duties run to creditors.")); FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4 th Cir. 1982)
("When the corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stockholders
to the creditors.") cert, denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983). See also Collier Business Workout Guide Section 3.03
[1] (1999).
24
creditors.
103 Some commentators assert that such "expanded fiduciary duty of the trustee
(the debtor in possession) . . . stems from the notion that a corporate entity should be
operated to respond to the interests of those who hold an immediate financial stake in the
entity.
104
In the solvent corporation, the shareholders hold such a stake. In an insolvent
corporation, however, because the firm's assets are inadequate to pay off all of its debts,
the claims of the creditors take on a significance akin to those of the shareholders."
105
The majority of bankruptcy courts have required that a DIP justify its actions under
the corporate fiduciary standard.
106 Under this rule, the DIP is held to the same standards
of care and loyalty that corporate directors and officers owe to their corporation and its
shareholders.
107 The duty of loyalty, for example, prohibits directors from using their
positions of trust and control for self-dealing. The duty of care requires directors to use
reasonable efforts and procedures to make an informed and knowledgeable decision. 109 In
contrast, an uninformed decision is made when the DIP is grossly negligent in its
decision-making process and, as a result, makes a bad decision 110 in light of the goals of
Chapter 1 1, estate preservation and creditor protection. Under the business judgment rule,
103
See, e.g., In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7 th Cir. 1987) (addressing that the debtor in
possession has a duty to maximize the value of the estate); Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm.
(In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 52 B.R. 879, 885 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1985) (stating that the debtor in
possession is "bound to act in the best interest of the corporation [and] as fiduciary] of the estate").
Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter II Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73
B.U.L. Rev. 581, 611-12 (1993). See Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business
Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 Bankr. Dev. J. 1, 31-32
(1989).
105
Id.
106
See, e.g., Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 131 1 (5 th Cir. 1985).
107
See, e.g., In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513, 515 (7
th
Cir. 1991).
108
Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations Section 235, at 627 (3d ed. 1983). See also
William A. Klein & J. Mark Ramseyer, Business Associations, at 299 (1991); Robin E. Phelan, Is the Fox
Guarding the Henhouse: Corporate Governance Issuedfor the Financially Troubled Company, 709
PLI/Comm 739, 752(1995).
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which is the core of corporate fiduciaries' duty of care, the DIP has a duty to be informed
before making a decision, but it has no duty to reveal the information to any of the
interested parties.
111 Under the rule, as long as the DIP articulates a reasonable basis for
its decision,
112
and the decision is not arbitrary or capricious, the court will not blame its
judgment. 113
The corporate fiduciary standard thus gives the DIP much leeway in its decision-
making. Its decision can pass the court's review unless it is, for example, "tainted by
fraud, illegality, self-dealing, or is uninformed."
114 The reasons that courts have given
debtors this enlarged discretion include expediting the administration of a case and
minimizing the cost to the estate, 115 promoting the negotiating process, 116 relieving the
court of administrative duties,
117
and allowing the DIP to operate the business more
actively.
118
Another fiduciary standard that a DIP may be held to is the common law trustee
standard. The nature and extent of the powers and duties of a common law trustee are
determined by the terms of the trust. 119 In the absence of any provisions in the terms of
the trust, they are determined by rules such as those stated in section 169-96 of the
109
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). See Corinne Ball & Robert L. Messineo,
Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of the Financially Troubled Company: A Primer, 971 PLI/Corp.
171 (1996).
110
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
111
John T. Roache, The Fiduciary Obligation ofa Debtor in Possession, 1993 U. 111. L. Rev. 133, 148
(1993).
112
See In re Johns-Mansville Corp., 60 B.R. 612, 616 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1986).
113
Id.
114
John T. Roache, The Fiduciary Obligation ofa Debtor in Possession, 1993 U. 111. L. Rev. 133, 133
(1993).
115
See, e.g., Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1311 (5 th Cir. 1985).
" 6
In re Lyon & Reboli, Inc., 24 B.R. 152, 154 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982).
1,7
Id.
m
Id.
" 9
Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 164 (1959).
26
Restatement (Second) of Trusts. " In comparison with the corporate fiduciary obligations,
those of a common law trustee are more stringent duties of loyalty and care. " A common
law trustee bears a duty to furnish information within a reasonable time,
1
a duty to
preserve the trust,
123
a duty to defend and enforce claims,
124
a duty to exercise reasonable
care and skill, 125 and a duty to deal impartially with the beneficiaries. 126
Although the majority of the courts abide by the business judgment rule in the areas
of duty of care, some bankruptcy courts implicitly have held not only bankruptcy trustees
but also DIPs to the fiduciary duties of a common law trustee.
127
In In re Frankel,
n%
the
Bankruptcy Court of the Western District of New York State held the DIP to a more
stringent standard of fiduciary duty. The court held that the corporate officer had a duty to
exercise the quantum of care that a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would
exercise in caring for creditors' collateral. Further, the court stated, "[a] breach of this
duty, whether knowing or negligent, could result in liability attaching." 129 Moreover,
some other courts have held that the most important fiduciary duty of the DIP is to keep
the courts and creditors informed of the status of the business under reorganization. 130
120
Id.
121
Id. Sections 170, 174.
122
7,4. Section 173.
123
Id. Section 176.
124
Id. Sections 177-78.
125
Id. Section 174.
126
Id. Section 183.
127
See, e.g., In re Frankel, 11 B.R. 401 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1987) (holding that the DIP has a duty to
exercise the same care that a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would exercise); In re Roblin
Indus., Inc., 52 B.R. 241 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1985); In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339 (9 th
Cir. 1983).
128 77 B.R. 401 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1987).
n9
Frankel, 77 B.R. at 404.
130
E.g., In re UNR Indus., Inc., 42 B.R. 99, 101 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1984); In re Modern Office Supply, Inc.,
943, 954 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); In re Ford, 36 B.R. 501, 504 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
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The bankruptcy court in In re McClure i3i held that the disclosure of the debtor's financial
condition by periodic reporting to interested parties is high on the list of fiduciary duties
of the DIP and is to be excused only for justifiable cause.
132
These cases can be analyzed
in the context of two categories: that a DIP may be held liable for negligent decisions and
that the obligations of the DIP include the duty to reveal necessary information.
133 Taken
together, these cases basically hold the DIP to the fiduciary duties of a common law
trustee.
The bankruptcy courts have held the DIP to more stringent fiduciary standards than
those typically imposed upon non-bankruptcy corporation fiduciaries. 134 The Chapter 1
1
trustee's fiduciary obligations are almost identical to those of a common law trustee, and
a DIP is in the shoes of a trustee in almost every event. Thus a DIP is subject to fiduciary
obligations similar to those of a common law trustee. There are some differences,
however, between the two fiduciary duties. A common law trustee may be held liable for
mere negligence, but, under the business judgment rule, a DIP is liable only for gross
negligence. In addition, while a common law trustee traditionally has a duty to disclose to
the beneficiaries all material facts that might affect the value of the assets, 135 a DIP has
only the duty to be properly informed before making a decision. 136 The courts' holdings
31 69 B.R. 282 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987).
132
Id. at 289.
133
See the cases cited in supra note 130. See also Restatement (Second) Section 173 (1959).
134
Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter II Debtors in Possession: "Don 't Look Back—
Something May Be Gaining on You, " 68 Am. Bankr. L.J. 155, 185 (1994).
135 See In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513, 516 (7 th Cir. 1991); Restatement (Second) of Trust Section 170(2),
Section 173(1959).
136
See Smith v. Van Gorcom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
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in many cases 137 indicate that there is at least a trend among some bankruptcy courts
toward the need for more stringent fiduciary duties on the part of the DIP.
The functions of the fiduciary duties of the DIP are twofold: they represent the logical
grounds for statutory duties of the DIP, and they provide the basis for the DIP's liabilities
to the estate and its constituencies. If the managers of a DIP fail to meet the duties, they
are personally responsible for the damages caused by their intentional or negligent
activities. The courts ultimately decide the scope of the duties and the degrees of care and
loyalty through interpretation of the Code. If the courts expand the scope of the fiduciary
duty of the DIP, its discretion in reorganization would accordingly be restricted.
B. The Creditors' Committee
1 . General Description
Chapter 1 1 created several methods designed to oversee the DIP and to prevent its
indiscretion.
138 Committees of several kinds, such as the creditors' committee and the
equity shareholders' committee, are some of the methods. Most importantly, Congress
established a mandatory creditors' committee to represent unsecured creditors and
"investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the
operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such
business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan . . . ." 139
137
See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Smith v.
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
138 The role of a creditors' committee is not limited to such a supervisory role. "A well-functioning creditors'
committee can contribute to building consensus around sound and fair solutions to business problems more
effectively through its mediative power than as an advocate for a particular interest." Daniel J. Bussel,
Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1547, 1550 (1996).
139
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 103(c)(2) (1994).
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Secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity owners in Chapter 1 1 have
substantially different channels of control or influence on a case. The main control source
for secured creditors is based on their lien or property interest in collateral. The DIP can
use the assets of the estate in the ordinary course of business, but its rights to use the
property are ultimately limited by the secured creditors' interests.
140
In addition, a
reorganization plan cannot be confirmed unless secured creditors receive under the plan
at least the value of their collateral.
141
Unlike secured creditors, unsecured creditors and
equity owners have no rights in specific property. Instead, they can individually respond
to issues presented for a vote, file claims, raise issues for litigation, and exercise informal
persuasion. The creation of such representative committees thus helps the creditors and
equity owners systematically and effectively protect their interests. Among the various
possible committees, an equity shareholders' committee has a strong incentive to
reorganize the debtor, often regardless of the debtor's viability. In particular, in cases of
closely held companies, such a committee shares the same interests as the DIP. It would
therefore suffice for the purposes of the thesis to discuss the creditor committee alone
because this thesis attempts to discover some methods that are appropriate for restricting
the DIP's discretion in order to reduce the rate of unsuccessful reorganization. For similar
reasons, the secured creditors' committee is also not a main focus of this thesis.
140
See 1 1 U.S.C. Section 362; In re Timbers oflnwood Forest, 808 F.2d 363 (5 th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108
S.Ct. 626(1987).
141
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 129(b) (1994).
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2. The Unsecured Creditors' Committee
Under section 1 102(a)(1), the United States Trustee must appoint at least one
unsecured creditors' committee in every Chapter 1 1 reorganization case unless the court
orders for cause that one not be appointed in a small business case.
142 The court may also
order the appointment of additional committees it deems appropriate to represent an
interest adequately.
143 However, in practice, multiple committees are uncommon, except
in mega cases. 144 Whether the bankruptcy court has the power to review and alter the
United States Trustee's creditors' committee appointments is controversial. In light of
policies underlying Section 105 of the Code, which grants the courts a significant
discretionary power in managing a case, it can be said that the court may order the United
States Trustee to alter committee membership only when it finds that the original
appointment was clearly erroneous. 145
The unsecured creditors' committee ordinarily consists of persons willing to serve and
selected from the debtor's seven largest unsecured creditors. 146 There are no requirements
" Dispensing with the appointment of a creditors' committee in a small business case pursuant to Section
1 102(a)(3) does not depend on the debtor's decision to be treated as a small business under Section 1 121(e).
See In re Haskell-Dawes, Inc., 188 B.R. 515 (E.D. Pa 1995).
143
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 102(a)(1) (1994).
See Ronald W. Goss, Chapter] I of the Bankruptcy Code: An Overview for the General Practitioner, 4
Utah B.J. 8, 10(1991)
145
Cases based on this view adopted either the "arbitrary and capricious standard," e.g., In re First
Republicbank Corp., 95 B.R. 58 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) or the "abuse of discretion standard." See, e.g., In
re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996); In re Value Merchants Inc., 202 B.R. 280
(E.D. Wis. 1996). There are, however, other views maintaining that the court has no power to alter the
committee appointed by the United States Trustee, e.g., In re McLean Industries Inc., 70 B.R. 852 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Victory Markets Inc., 196 B.R. 1 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); In re New Life Fellowship
Inc., 202 B.R. 994 (Bankr. W.D. Ok. 1996), and that the court has de novo power to alter a committee's
composition, e.g., In re Public Service Co. ofNew Hampshire, 89 B.R. 1014 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988). See
generally Bruce H. White, A Question ofAuthority: Can the Bankruptcy Court Alter the Composition of
Creditors' Committees Appointed by the U.S. Trustee?, 16-Aug Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 22 (1997); Lewis
Kruger & Mark A. Speiser et al., Understanding the Basics of Bankruptcy and Reorganization 1998, 780
PLI/Comm 863, 865-68 (1998).
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1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 102(b)(1). Although the Code provides that the unsecured creditors' committee shall
ordinarily consist of those persons who are willing to serve and holding the seven largest unsecured claims
for a person or entity to qualify to sit on the committee. The person or entity can hold the
unsecured deficiency portion of a secured claim, can be a trade creditor, or can be the
union representative. The committee members are reimbursed for the actual expenses
incurred in connection with their participation on the committee.
147
These expenses are
considered administrative expenses.
148 The creditors' committee is a separate legal entity,
distinct from its members or any specific creditor sitting on the committee. 149 The
committee protects the interests of its constituents by monitoring the DIP's activities and
negotiates a plan with the DIP.
150 The committee may employ professionals to assist in
the reorganization process.
151 The employment of the committee professionals is subject
to court approval, and approved professionals are entitled to reasonable compensation as
administrative expenses. 1
The responsibilities and rights of the committee are diverse: to consult with the DIP
concerning the administration of the case; 153 to investigate the financial condition and the
conduct of the DIP; 154 to participate in the plan negotiation; 155 and to perform other
against the debtor, these requirements are not mandatory. Virginia A. Bell & Paul B. Jones, Creditors'
Committees and Their Roles in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1993 Det. C.L. Rev. 1551 (1993). For the
equity security holders' committee, see 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 102 (b)(2) (1994).
1 1 U.S.C. Section 503(b)(3)(d). Committee members' expenses are to be reimbursed from the estate
without their having to prove that the individual members substantially contributed to the case. John D.
Penn, Controlling the Composition and Creation of Creditors' Committees, 16-May Am. Bankr. Inst. L.J.
40,40(1997).
148
Id; 11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(1) (1994).
149
See In re Saxon Indus., Inc., 29 B.R. 320, 321 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983); In re Proof of the Pudding, Inc.,
3 B.R. 645, 648 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1980).
150
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 103 (1994).
151
Id. Section 1 103(a). The counsel for the unsecured creditors' committee has a fiduciary relationship to all
unsecured creditors, not just to the committee members. E.g., In re General Homes Corp., 181 B.R. 870
(S.D. Tex. 1994); In re Barney's Inc., 197 B.R. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
152
1 1 U.S.C. Sections 330, 503(b)(4), 507(a)(1), and 1103(a) (1994).
153
Id. Section 1 103 (c)(1). See also In re Jefley, Inc., 219 B.R.88 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (The court directed the
creditors' committee to participate in attempted bargaining with the union so that the creditors' interests
could be directly negotiated.)
154
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 103 (c)(2) (1994).
155
Id. Section 1103(c)(3).
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services in the interest of those represented.
156 Thus, in theory, the unsecured creditors'
committee should exert significant influence on the outcome of the reorganization
proceeding by preventing the DEP's indiscretions. In practice, however, it rarely
influences the proceeding.
157 The committee has fallen short of Congress's expectations.
In smaller cases, the committee sometimes does not even exist because of the absence of
creditors' concerns.
158 Even in cases where a committee is formed, it may not work
properly.
159
In larger cases, even though the committee has broad powers, the powers are
not always
utilized.
160 Sometimes the attorney of a committee actively monitors the case and
incoming reports about the business, 161 thereby in part curbing the DIP's indiscretions.
Criticisms about the unsecured creditors' committee are abundant because of the
substantial cost to the estate " and its ineffectiveness. Most of the costs incurred are
agency costs, and they can be significant if the case is prolonged. The ineffectiveness of
the committee is due to several factors. First, the lack of compensation beyond expenses
discourages the committee members to be active in committee matters because of the
156
Id. Section 1 103 (c)(5); see In re George Worthington Co., 921 F.2d 626, 633 (9
th
Cir. 1990) (citing In
re GHR Energy Corp., 35 B.R. 539, 543 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983)).
1 Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter II Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73
B.U.L. Rev. 581,614(1993).
158
Karen Gross & Matthew S. Barr, Bankruptcy Solutions in the United States: An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.
Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 215, 232 (1997). Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, in small cases, on
request of a party in interest, the court may order, for cause, not to appoint a creditors' committee ( 1
1
U.S.C. Section 1 102 (a)(3)). A "small business" is defined by the Code as a person engaged in commercial
or business activities (other than a person whose primary activity is owning or operating real property)
whose aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debts do not exceed $2,000,000 (11
U.S.C. Section 101 (51C)).
159
Gross & Barr, supra note 158, at 232.
160
Id.
161 Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian
Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 Harv. Int'l L.J. 267, 306 (1994).
uconsiderable time they have to spend. 163 Second, the committee members rarely have the
expertise necessary to perform their expected duties.
164 Few of the committee members
have experience with reorganization proceedings; still fewer of them have the skills
necessary to evaluate or investigate a debtor's business
165 because few of them may have
been involved in bankruptcy cases. Third, perhaps most importantly, the ineffectiveness
of the committee is caused by the fact that it cannot directly control the activities of the
DIP.
166 The unsecured creditors' committee can influence the DIP's decision making, but
cannot compel it. 167
b
" Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as
Producer, Director and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 43 1 , 450-
51 (1995).
163
Adams, supra note 157, at 615.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
ibl
Id.
Chapter III
Roles of the Bankruptcy Courts
According to the basic scheme of the Code, the bankruptcy court's roles are limited to
those of a disinterested adjudicator who functions only when a legal controversy has
arisen. However, because the creditors' committee, the counterpart of the DIP, and the
mere existence of the fiduciary duty of the DIP have proved to be not enough to ensure
fair and efficient proceedings, the bankruptcy courts' active involvement in the process
has been required to make reorganization proceedings more expeditious and efficient. 168
The Code, however, does not provide specific ways for the court to make the process
efficient. Because the practical realities and necessities involved in a case vary, a
narrowly defined provision cannot meet such a variety of circumstances. Therefore,
Section 105 of the Code grants a comprehensive power to the courts to meet the various
demands of cases. The language of the section appears to give the courts unlimited
discretion. It is thus said that the bankruptcy court is a court of equity. 169 This does not
168
This view is based on the assumption that although the current provisions of Chapter 1 1 of the Code
have not proved successful in practice, the goals underlying those provisions are laudable. There are those
commentators who argue that Chapter 1 1 should be abolished in its entirety. See Michael Bradley &
Michael Rosenberg, The Untenable Case for Chapter 77,11 Yale L.J. 1043, 1078 (1992); James W.
Bowers, Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for Choosing among Bankruptcy
Hypotheses, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 955, 976-77 (1994). Some others question whether the underlying premises
of Chapter 1 1 have been justified. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits ofBankruptcy Law,
209-24 (1986); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. Legal Stud. 127
(1986).
169
See, e.g., Brian Leepson, Note & Comment, A Case for the Use ofa Broad Court Equity Power to
Facilitate Chapter 11 Reorganization, 12 Bankr. Dev. J. 775 (1996); Robert H. George, Note, Bankruptcy
for Nonbankruptcy Purposes: Are There Any Limits?, 6 Rev. Litig. 95 (1987).
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mean, however, that the bankruptcy court is a traditional court of equity.
170
It means,
instead, that the court is "a specialized court of limited jurisdiction applying statutory law
that embodies a particular, often changing, social objective." 171 Because bankruptcy
reorganization law should meet such changing circumstances, the courts accordingly have
much discretion in interpreting and applying the law. 172 In this sense, the bankruptcy
court can be referred to as a court of equity, but its discretion in interpretation should be
kept within the generally accepted limitations of jurisprudence. 173
The scope of the court's powers in making a reorganization case efficient by, for
example, filtering out nonviable debtors from the relief will thus be defined through the
interpretation of the statutory language of the relevant provisions, such as Section 105
and Section 1 1 12 of the Code. In order to discuss the scope of the court's powers, it
would be helpful to examine the historical background of the court's powers in advance.
A. Evolution of the Courts' Equitable Power
1 . Separation of Functions
As mentioned above, 174 Chapter 1 1 of the Code basically relies on the bargain
between the DIP and its creditors for a successful reorganization; this cannot be achieved,
170
Hon. Marcia S. Krieger, "The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court ofEquity": What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C.
L. Rev. 275, 310(1999).
1
" See id. at 297 (asserting, in relevant part, that the phrase "court of equity" is used in three different ways.
First, it is and has been used to define the scope of the court's jurisdiction and authority. Second, the phrase
has been used to legitimize the social policy underlying bankruptcy law and to justify a conclusion or result
where the result is not that of application of statutory law. Third, the powers of an equitable court are
invoked by parties who want to get a result that seems fair to them but may not be consistent with the law).
173 The court's discretion in interpretation is allowed not because the court is a court of equity but because
bankruptcy law concerning reorganization should meet the varieties and changing needs of society. Many of
the Code's provisions are also comprehensive enough to invoke the court's considerable discretion in
interpretation. See, e.g., 1 1 U.S.C. Section 105(a) & (d).
174
See Chapter II-B of this thesis.
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however, without the bankruptcy court's supervision and intervention. Then the question
becomes to what extent the bankruptcy courts should be involved in the case
management. Under the Bankruptcy Act, 175 bankruptcy courts or judges were actively
involved in the case management and in the ordinary affairs of reorganization cases. In
other words, under the Act, the courts played important roles in performing
administrative, supervisory, and clerical functions in addition to their judicial duties. 176
The Act required that the courts be actively involved in the procedure because creditor
participation was below congressional expectation and offered insufficient guarantee that
creditors' interests were protected and that the reorganization case would proceed fairly
and efficiently. This in part led to the perception that lawyers and trustees, instead of
creditors and equity owners, controlled bankruptcy cases and that judges were biased
because of their involvement in the debtor's affairs and business. This perception was
grounded upon "the direct involvement of the bankruptcy judges in the administrative
aspects of bankruptcy cases, selection and appointment of trustees and subsequent
decisions by the judges on legal issues that arose out of or referenced information
obtained by the judges during the administrative processes." 177
In designing the Code, Congress recognized the negative impacts of the court on the
credibility of the reorganization procedure. Congress thus removed a wide range of
administrative matters from the bankruptcy judge. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code,
accordingly, transferred many of the supervisory functions from the judge to a case
175 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1938, Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed in 1978)
176
Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of the Role of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23
Seton Hall L. Rev. 1329, 1337(1993).
177
Ericka P. Rogers, United States Trustee System, 2 Nev. Law (Mar. 1994), at 16.
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trustee and to the United States Trustee.
178 The Code involves the judge only when a
dispute has arisen. Under the Code, therefore, "the bankruptcy court should become a
forum that is fair in fact and in appearance as well"
1
since the judge no longer is obliged
to take an active role in managing bankruptcy cases. In addition to the creation of the
United States Trustee, the Code prohibits the bankruptcy judges from attending creditors'
meetings. 180 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure also prohibits ex parte
communications between the court and parties in interest. 1 '
2. The Need for Efficiency
However, since Congress enacted the Code in 1978, the principle of separation of
judicial and administrative functions has been eroded continuously because the need for
efficiency in the prosecution of Chapter 1 1 cases has increased. Partly due to creditor
apathy and partly because of the uniform performance in administrative rules and
practices by the United States Trustee, 182 bankruptcy judges have become increasingly
involved in the administration of bankruptcy cases 183
78
Miller, supra note 162, at 434.
179
House Report, supra note 5 1 , at 4. See generally Paul N. Silverstein & Harold Jones, The Evolving Role
of Bankruptcy Judges Under the Bankruptcy Code, 51 Brook. L. Rev. 555 (1985). See also In re Gusam
Restaurant Corp., Ill F.2d 274 (2nd Cir. 1984), rev'g 32 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (concluding
that Congress's expressed intent to curtail excessive judicial involvement in administrative matters and the
Code's legislative history prohibiting the sua sponte conversion of cases made clear that Section 1 1 12(b)
requirement of a request by a party in interest should be read literally).
180
1 1 U.S.C. Section 341(c) (1994).
181
Fed. R. Bank. P. 9003.
182
Miller, supra note 162, at 435.
183
See, e.g., United Savings Association v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Associates Ltd.), 808 F.2d 363 (5 th Cir. 1987), affd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
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3. Amendments to Section 105
To meet this increased need for active case management on the part of the bankruptcy
courts, Congress amended Section 105 of the Code in 1986. The amendment was
intended to authorize the courts to take any action and make any determination necessary
to enforce a court order or rule on a sua sponte basis to prevent abuses of the
reorganization process. Since the effective date
184
of the amendment, the courts have
frequently issued broad sweeping orders to control or manage a case. In addition,
before the status conferences were codified in Section 105(d) of the Code in 1994, the
courts often used Bankruptcy Rule 7016, which applies Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to adversary proceedings in reorganization cases. Under Bankruptcy Rule
7016, the judge could organize and conduct a pretrial conference in order to, for example,
expedite the case, prevent wasteful pretrial activities, and facilitate the settlement of the
186
case.
1 R7
In 1994, Congress again amended Section 105 of the Code, authorizing bankruptcy
judges to hold status conferences sua sponte or on a motion of a party in interest. The
status conference can be held in any reorganization case or proceeding after notice to
parties in interest. At the conferences, unless it is inconsistent with another provision of
the Code or Bankruptcy Rules, the court can issue an order prescribing limitations and
conditions as the judge deems appropriate to ensure that the case proceeds expeditiously
184
Oct. 27, 1986. See Pub.L. 99-554, Title II, Section 203, 100 Stat. 3097.
185 See generally Manuel D. Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29 S. Tex. L. Rev. 487
(1988).
186 See Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
187
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.L. 103-394, Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4108.
188
11 U.S.C. Section 105(d) (1994).
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and economically. 189 Such orders include, among others, setting a date by which the
debtor must file a disclosure statement and a reorganization plan; setting a date by which
the debtor must assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease; and setting a
date by which a party in interest other than a debtor may file a plan. 190 By amending
Section 105 of the Code, Congress formally acknowledged that active case administration
by bankruptcy courts often benefits all parties and increases the efficiency of the
bankruptcy process.
191
4. Scope of the Courts' Equitable Power under Section 105
Even if one admits that Section 105 of the Code grants a wide range of equity or
discretionary power to the bankruptcy court, the question of whether the court has the
power to "fill the gaps left by the statutory language" still remains unanswered. For
example, unlike most other courts, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed the
use of cross-collateralization in Shapiro v.Saybrook Manufacturing Co., Inc. ~ Cross-
collateralization alters the general distribution scheme mandated in bankruptcy
reorganization. Despite the lack of express authorization, many courts have permitted
cross-collateralization, using the courts' equitable powers to effect a result consistent with
the rehabilitation of the debtor, which these courts considered to be the primary goal of
189
Id. Section 105(d)(2).
190
Id. Because the enumerated items of Section 105(d)(2) are not exclusive, the court may order the DIP,
for example, to combine the plan and disclosure statement into one simple and precise document. Such an
order will contribute to reducing time and money in the reorganization process. See Hon. Leif M. Clark,
Keeping It Simple: A Case Study, 17-Jan Am Bankr. Inst. J. 28, 43 (1998).
191
Miller, supra note 162, at 439.
192
In re Saybrook Manufacturing Co., Inc., 963 F.2d 1490, 1496 (1
1
th
Cir. 1992).
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Chapter 1 1 of the Code. 193 Another disagreement among the courts arises regarding
payments to pre-petition creditors. Several appellate courts disallow the payments on the
ground that such payments will contravene the statutorily established methods of
distribution.
194 The courts denying the bankruptcy court the power to fill the gap left by
the statutory language consider that the application of Section 105(a) of the Code is
limited to a furtherance of expressly delineated Code sections. 195 Other courts allow such
payments by utilizing the courts' equitable powers under Section 105(a) to move beyond
the strict statutory mandates.
196
However, some commentators argue that the bankruptcy courts have the powers to fill
the gap left by the statutory language because Section 105 of the Code grants such
equitable powers to the courts. 197 This opinion emphasizes that "(e]quity developed out of
a recognition of a need for flexibility, a realization that strict reliance on the written law
will lead to unjust and inefficient results, and a belief that special remedies should be
i no
judicially devised in appropriate circumstances." This opinion may, however, be
confused about the distinction between the nature of bankruptcy law and the bankruptcy
courts' power. The Code indeed includes many equitable provisions, 199 and, therefore, the
9
See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors' Comm. V. First Nat' I Bank & Trust (In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co.),
834 F.2d 599, 603 (6
th
Cir. 1987); Burchinal v. Central Washington Bank (In re Adams Apple, IncJ, 829
F.2d 1484, 1490 (9
th
Cir. 1987); Borne Chem. Co. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp. (In re Borne Chem.
Co.), 9 B.R. 263, 269-70 (Bankr.D. N.J. 1984).
1 Chiason v. Louis Matherne & Associates (In re Oxford Management, Inc.), 4 F.3d 1329, 1337 (5 th Cir.
1993).
195 i .„i£n „. -i-i£ / .: i /"„;/:.,.. „„ d„„/, .„., oi incni „» i nc r\A 1 1 c*
196
Leepson. supra note 169, at 776 (quoting 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, % 105.01, at 105-04 (15 ed.))
See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 179 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1989); In re Gulf Air, 112
B.R. 152, 154 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1989).
197
Leepson, supra note 169, at 807.
198
Id. at 777.
199
E.g., automatic stay, the broad definition of the estate, strong-arm powers to marshal assets, avoidance of
liens, sale of estate assets free and clear of liens or interests, equitable subordination of claims, and coercing
debtors to explain their past financial affairs are all like equitable relief that can be obtained in non-
bankruptcy courts. Krieger, supra note 170, at 295.
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courts can exercise a broad discretionary power in interpreting or applying such
provisions to a specific case. The fact that the courts have discretionary power does not
mean that the bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. It means, instead, that the courts can
fill the gaps left by the statutory language, but they cannot move beyond the expressed
mandates of the Code. 2
5. Use of Section 105 for ADR
In conjunction with Section 105 of the Code, the bankruptcy courts are increasingly
utilizing alternative dispute resolution methods to manage bankruptcy cases effectively.
One of the prime examples is the use of the mediation process in Chapter 1 1 cases. 201
Mediation is a non-binding process, in which an independent person is introduced "to
induce rationality among the parties and avoid expensive, vexatious, and protracted
pursuit of litigation tactics or stalemated negotiations."202 Section 105 of the Code has
been used in several cases to solve claims disputes. 203 This section offers many potentials
for the efficient execution of reorganization cases.
200 One of the problems related to the various discretion among the judges is "forum shopping." According
to an empirical study, the perception that case processing varies among the bankruptcy judges induces
forum shopping, which really means "judge shopping." Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping
for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 Cornell L.
Rev. 967, 1002 (1999). See also Hon. Leif M. Clark & Douglas E. Deutsch, The Delaware Gap: Exposing
New Flaws in the Scheme of Bankruptcy Referrals, 5 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 257 (1997).
201
Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as
Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 431, 436
(1995).
202
Id.
203
Id. at 438 n. 25.
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B. The Courts' Debtor Screening204 Role
In order to reduce the costs incurred during reorganization cases, it is necessary to
administer a case expeditiously and efficiently. In particular, preventing debtors not
90S
deserving reorganization efforts from coming into the process is most important. Under
the Code, debtors abusing the automatic stay and those without a going concern value do
not deserve reorganization efforts. Should such debtors come into the process, they
must be expelled as early as possible to protect creditors from unnecessary costs.
There are several methods developed by theory or expressly provided by the Code
provisions to which the courts can resort to prevent debtors not deserving reorganization
from entering the process, or to oust them. First, various courts and commentators are in
agreement that, under the Code, there is an implied good faith requirement in filing a case
even though the Code does not explicitly provide such a requirement. 207 Second,
according to Section 362(d) of the Code, the court can grant relief from the stay to a party
in interest for cause, including lack of adequate protection of the party in interest. 208 If
such relief is granted for a creditor, the case often loses its merit and the process stops.
Third, pursuant to Section 1 1 12(b) of the Code, the court can convert a reorganization
case to Chapter 7 liquidation or dismiss a case for cause if such conversion or dismissal is
204
In this thesis, "debtor screening" is used to mean both the effort to select debtors eligible for
reorganization immediately after the filing and the effort to expel debtors without eligibility from the
reorganization process by either dismissing the case or converting it to a liquidation case.
205
Debtors not deserving reorganization include those without going concern or economic viability and
those whose management is abusing the process in order to thwart the creditors.
206 However, if a debtor is viable despite the management of the debtor being incompetent or dishonest,
such a debtor can be reorganized. In such a case, the DIP should be replaced with a trustee, and the case
should not be dismissed.
207
Carlos J. Cuevas, Good Faith and Chapter 11: Standard That Should Be Employed to Dismiss Bad
Faith Chapter 11 Cases, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 525, 525 (1993).
208
11 U.S.C. Section 362(d) (1994).
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in the best interest of creditors.
209
Fourth, the court may apply Section 305 of the Code to
dismiss a case or suspend all proceedings if the court deems that such dismissal or
suspension would better serve the interests of creditors and the debtor.
210 However,
Section 305 of the Code has rarely been used to dismiss a case. Where there is no explicit
provision of the Code that can be utilized under certain circumstances, the court
sometimes resorts to Section 105 of the Code to screen or expel some kinds of debtors
from the process. Section 105 expressly gives the court the authority to take any action or
make any determination necessary or appropriate to prevent an abuse of process.
The relationships among the various debtor screening methods are rather complicated.
The dismissal of a case under Section 305 is rarely used because such dismissal cannot be
reviewed by appeal. 211 Section 105 has been used by several courts in conjunction with
Section 1 1 12(b), while some courts have used Section 105 as a ground for protecting the
courts' integrity
212
when dismissing a case with prejudice. Further, Section 1 1 12(b) is
used as a ground for recognizing the implied requirement of good faith filing. The
difference is that the implied threshold requirement, unlike Section 1 1 12(b), is applicable
at the preliminary stages of a reorganization case. According to this view, bad faith, the
counterpart of good faith, is one of the indications that constitutes the "cause" of Section
1 1 12(b) of the Code. In other words, "bad faith" is a version of the cause on the side of
the debtor.
209
Id. Section 1112(b).
210
A/. Section 305(A).
211
Luis F. Chaves, In Rem Bankruptcy Refiling Bars: Will They Stop Abuse of the Automatic Stay Against
Mortgages? 24 Cal. Bankr. J. 3, 14 (1998).
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1 . Good Faith Filing Requirement
Unlike the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
213 Chapter 1 1 of the Code does not explicitly
require that a reorganization case be filed in good faith. However, the threshold good
faith test has been adopted among the courts. 214 With respect to the meaning of "good
faith," various courts are in disagreement. The divergent opinions about the question of
what constitutes good faith stem from the different views about the goals and policies of
reorganization law.
Some courts' decisions focus exclusively on the debtor's ability to reorganize215 as an
indication of good faith. Under this test, the debtor's motive for filing for Chapter 1 1 is
irrelevant to good faith. 216 This view, the objective test, asserts that because the
subjective test relies on the debtor's speculative inner motive, it allows the court to
exercise too much discretion in determining whether to dismiss a case.' 17 The objective
test is consistent with the purpose of business reorganization, which is to provide a
vehicle for the rehabilitation of a distressed business.
218 The weakness of this test is that it
ignores the importance of the subjective purpose or intent of the DIP, which is an
~ The bankruptcy crimes statute is also designed to ensure the integrity of the bankruptcy court by
criminalizing intentional and fraudulent abuse of the process. Tamara Ogier & Jack F. Williams,
Bankruptcy Crimes and Bankruptcy Practice, 6 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 317, 329 (1998).
213
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1898. It governed all bankruptcy cases filed prior to October 1, 1979.
214
See, e.g., In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, 931 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1991); Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d
693 (4
th
Cir. 1989); Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Insurance Co. (In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd.), 849
F.2d 1393 (1
1
th
Cir. 1988); Little Creek Development Corp. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co. (In re Little
Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068 (5
th
Cir. 1986).
215 The objective test is premised upon the notion that a debtor must have a realistic possibility of
reorganizing. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, 98 B.R. 174, 177-78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re
Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1 136, 1 137 (6
th
Cir. 1985); N.L.R.B. V. Bidisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S.
513, 527 (1984). If it is evident from the commencement of a case that reorganization is unlikely, then
courts will find objective bad faith. If so, courts probably will find subjective bad faith, too, if the only
reason that the case was filed was to thwart the creditors. Cf. Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693 (4
th
Cir.
1989)
216
Eugene J. DiDonato, Good Faith Reorganization Petitions: The Back Door Lets the Stranger In, 16
Conn. L. Rev. 1,26-27(1983).
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important concept in commercial law. 219 In a sense, reorganization law is an extension of
commercial law because it is a mechanism created to deal with a debtor who has
committed defaults. Moreover, subjective good faith insures that the DIP honestly intends
to reorganize and will treat its creditors with good faith, and that it will not use Chapter
1 1 only to evade its obligation to creditors.
220 The objective test is insufficient in that it
ignores the debtor's motive.
In contrast, the subjective test regards the bankruptcy system as an equitable process.
In order to receive equity, the debtor must have clean hands. This test looks for evidence
of motive. 2" 1 The viability of the debtor is immaterial to keep the case proceeding. Thus,
under this test, once subjective bad faith is established by showing that the debtor has
attempted to use the bankruptcy process to thwart the creditors' rights, the case should be
dismissed despite the prospect of a successful reorganization. 222 In In re Phoenix
Piccadilly, Ltd., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that "the
prospects of a successful reorganization do not override, as a matter of law, the finding of
bad faith . . . ." This view, however, also has some flaws. This test in part contradicts
the policy of the Code that intends to provide open access to distressed businesses.
Moreover, debtor rehabilitation is one of the goals of Chapter 1 1 and is at least as
2.7
Id. at 26.
2.8
See In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc., 709 F.2d 762,765 (1
st
Cir. 1983).
219
U.C.C. Section 1-203 (1990) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement."). For the definition of good faith, see U.C.C. Sections 1-201, 2-
103.
220
In re HBA East, Inc., 87 B.R. 248, 258-59 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1988); In re Southern Communities, Inc.,
57 B.R. 215, 218 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986).
221
See Michael J. Venditto, The Implied Requirement of "Good Faith" Filing: Where Are the Limits ofBad
Faith?, 1993 Det. C.L. Rev. 1591, 1598 (1993).
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Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Insurance Co. {In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd.), 849 F.2d 1393, 1395
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Cir. 1988); In re Denver Inv. Co., 141 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr. N.D. Fla 1992); In re Club Tower L.P.,
138 B.R. 307, 310 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
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In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd., 849 F.2d 1393, 1394 (1
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important as creditor protection. In addition, the subjective test also seems to be contrary
to the language of Code section 1 1 12(b), which protects creditors against a debtor who is
unable to reorganize.
224
There is another view that requires both objective futility and subjective bad faith to
dismiss a case. In Carolin Corp. v. Miller?
25
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit noted that because dismissal of a case at a preliminary stage was an
extraordinary remedy, it should be exercised only "with great care and caution.'" The
Fourth Circuit stated that, therefore, "something more than even the most obvious
likelihood of ultimate futility should be required to justify threshold dismissals . . . "2
The Fourth Circuit concluded that "both objective futility and subjective bad faith should
be shown in order to warrant dismissals for want of good faith in filing."* 8 The Fourth
Circuit Court rationalized this high standard by stating that if there is no question of
subjective bad faith, the ultimate futility issue is better left to post-petition
development. 229 Conversely, if the reorganization is not objectively futile, the debtor's
original motive or intent should not warrant dismissal. 230 This view is based on a
presumption that the implied threshold requirement should be different from the
requirements of Section 1 1 12(b) because there is a risk of premature dismissal of viable
cases in the preliminary dismissal. However, there is no justification for such different
treatment, and it would be a pure waste of resources to attempt to reorganize an
224
See, e.g.. In re Koerner, 800 F.2d 1358, 1368 (5
th
Cir. 1986); In re Fossum, 764 F.2d 520, 521-22 (8*
Cir. 1985). Absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation is one of the "causes" provided by Section
11 12(b) of the Code. 11 U.S.C. Section 1 1 12(b)(1) (1994).
225
Carolin Corp. v. Miller (In re Carolin Corp.), 886 F.2d 693 (4
th
Cir. 1989).
226
Id. at 700.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 700-701.
229
Id. at 701.
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absolutely nonviable debtor even if the case has been filed in subjective good faith. If the
case is destined to be dismissed by the application of Section 1 1 1 2(b) of the Code, it
would be better to dismiss the case earlier before it incurs costs hurting the creditors. The
standard of this view is too rigid to apply under the Code in that this view makes it
difficult for dismissal to occur.
Courts employing the totality of the circumstances test view the good faith
requirement as an important instrument for maintaining the integrity of the bankruptcy
system.
232 Under this test, a court examines all the facts and circumstances of the case,
using some factors to determine whether the petition has been filed in good faith. 233 This
test is often used to dismiss single asset real estate cases. 234 For example, in In re Little
Creek Development Co.~ the Fifth Circuit discussed the good faith requirement not only
for Code section 362(d),236 but also for Code section 1 1 12(b). 237 The court noted that the
good faith standard performed an important role in preventing a debtor from abusing the
]
i0
Id.
231 While insisting that the objective-subjective test adopted by the Fourth Circuit Court in Carolin Corp. v.
Miller, supra note 225, is the preferable good faith test, one commentator argues that in order for a debtor
to survive a motion for dismissal, the debtor must demonstrate both that it can reorganize and that the case
has not been filed in subjective bad faith. Carlos J. Cuevas, Good Faith and Chapter 11: Standard That
Should be Employed to Dismiss Bad Faith Chapter 11 Cases, 60 Tenn. Rev. 525, 530 (1993). However, the
test adopted in Carolin requires that the movant demonstrate both objective and subjective bad faith in
order to dismiss the case. Therefore, according to Carolin, if the reorganization is not objectively futile, the
debtor's subjective original intent does not warrant dismissal. Carolin 886 F.2d at 701. In contrast, under
the commentator's view, if a case has been filed in subjective bad faith, the case should be dismissed even if
the reorganization is not objectively futile.
232
In re Ravick Corp., 106 B.R. 834, 843 (Bankr. D. N.J 1989). In re HBA East, 87 B.R. 248, 258 (Bankr.
E.D. N.Y. 1988).
233
In re Village Green Realty Trust, 113 B.R. 105, 1 15-16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990); In re Sherwood Enters.,
1 12 B.R.165,168 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989).
234
See In re McCormick Rd. Assocs., 127 B.R. 410 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1991); In re Castleton Assocs., 109
B.R. 347 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1989); In re Northwest Place Ltd., 108 B.R. 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
235 7?9 F 2(j 106g (5
th
Cir 19g6)
236
1 1 U.S.C. Section 362(d) (1994). Section 362(d)(1) permits a creditor to seek relief from the automatic
stay for cause, and courts have held that bad faith constitutes cause for relief from the stay. See id.
362(d)(1).
237
Little Creek, supra note 214, at 1071-74.
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reorganization process and in protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy system/ It also
stated that to determine whether a case had been filed in good faith required an evaluation
of the totality of the circumstances, including the debtor's financial condition, motives
and the local financial realities.
239
This view is appropriate under the Code because it is
adjustable to any circumstances. 240 It can also take into consideration the goals and
policies underlying the bankruptcy law. Nevertheless, this view has been criticized for its
relying on particular, predetermined factors for determining bad faith and because it has
usually been applied in single asset debtor cases.
241
Indeed, the totality of the
circumstances test has been developed from single asset cases, but use of the test is not
exclusive.
242
Moreover, even though findings of lack of good faith in proceedings have
been predicated on certain recurring patterns, the patterns are only the results of case
analysis and are not exclusive. 4
238
Id. at 1072
239
Id.
240
This view is a dynamic one because the meaning of "totality of circumstances" is so flexible that it can
take into consideration varied and ever-changing social circumstances regarding bankruptcy policies. In this
sense, the implied good faith filing requirement is not a fixed institution that concerns itself with the need
for a procedural mechanism to abort obviously futile cases straightaway, but it is rather a dynamic device
founded on the desirability of forestalling filings aimed at achieving an objective beyond the accepted
purposes of the bankruptcy process. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good
Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel ofan Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 919, 946-47
(1991).
241
Carlos J. Cuevas, Good Faith and Chapter 11: Standard That Should be Employed to Dismiss Bad Faith
Chapter 11 Cases, 60 Tenn. Rev. 525, 537 (1993).
242
For example, in In re Sharon Steel Corporation, 871 F.2d 1217 (3rd Cir. 1989), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that "[u]nder the discretionary determination of cause required by 1
1
U.S.C. Section 1 104(a)(1) and the flexible standard embodied in (a)(2), the court acted within its discretion
in concluding that the totality of the circumstances signaled the need for a trustee." Id. at 1228.
243
See Little Creek, supra note 214, at 535 n. 70.
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2. Relief from the Stay
In a voluntary reorganization case, a debtor triggers the automatic stay upon the filing
of a bankruptcy petition.
244 The automatic stay functions as a stay against a variety of acts
affecting the debtor and the property of the estate.
245
Because of the conveniences
afforded by the automatic stay, some debtors tend to abuse it. If a debtor files a petition
solely to trigger the automatic stay, for example, the debtor without intention of
reorganization achieves its principal purpose simply by obtaining the stay. Later the case
may be dismissed by the court for such abuse or may be terminated by granting a creditor
relief from the stay. However, once the process proceeds, it incurs cost. Abusive filings
waste significant resources. Not only the debtor's creditors but also the entire bankruptcy
system, such as the courts, trustees, and other creditors, shares the cost.
Thus, Section 362(d) of the Code provides that on request of a party in interest, the
court may grant relief from the stay. 246 The relief includes termination, annulment, or
modification of the stay, and conditioning on the stay. 247 The court may grant a moving
creditor such relief from the stay in three situations. First, it can be granted to the creditor
for cause, which includes the fact that the creditor's interest in its collateral is not
adequately protected. 248 Therefore, when there is an "equity cushion" in the collateral
M
1 1 U.S.C. Section 362(a) (1994).
245
H. Rep. No. 95-595, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6296-97. ("The automatic stay is one of the
fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from
his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor
to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove
him into bankruptcy.").
246
1 1 U.S.C. Section 362(d).
247
Id.
24
*Id. Section 362(d)(1).
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providing sufficient protection to the creditor, relief will be denied.
249
In deciding
whether to grant relief from the stay for "cause" other than lack of adequate protection,
the courts apply a balancing approach.
250 When the prejudice the creditor would suffer if
the relief from stay were denied is more than the damage the debtor and other creditors
would sustain if the relief were granted, the court will lift the stay." Second, if the
debtor does not have any equity in the collateral and the collateral is not necessary to an
effective reorganization,
252
the relief will be granted. 253 Third, in single asset cases, a
moving creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in the real estate may be granted
relief from the stay if, within 90 days from the order for relief, the debtor has not either
filed a plan that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed in a reasonable time or
commenced monthly payments at a market rate of interest to each such creditor. 254
The relief from automatic stay functions in part as a method of creditor protection,
and, in some cases, such as single asset real estate,255 it plays a debtor screening role by
249
See In re Chauncey St. Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 107 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). Usually, an
equity cushion of 20% or more is considered adequate, but less than 1 1% is considered inadequate. See In
re Kost, 102 B.R. 829, 830-31 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1989). See generally Gerald F. Munitz, Adequate
Protection, the Automatic Stay, and the Use, Sale or Lease ofProperty, 796 PLI/Comm 231(1 999).
250
Therefore, according to this balancing approach, the equity cushion can be considered as only one factor
in determining whether to grant relief from the automatic stay. Lawrence J. Dash, The Equity Cushion
Analysis in Bankruptcy, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 149, 1 191 (1982).
251
See In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 152 B.R. 420, 424 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) (balancing the prejudice
that would be suffered if the stay were lifted, the relative hardship of the parties, and the probable success of
debtor rehabilitation).
52
For the meaning of "necessary to an effective reorganization," see Daniel A. O'Connor, Application of
the "Feasibility" Test Under Section 362(d)(2): Did Timbers Really Change Anything?, 9 Bankr. Dev. J.
133(1992).
253
1 1 U.S.C. Section 362(d)(2). See, e.g., In re Canal Place Ltd., Partnership, 921 F.2d 569 (5 th Cir.
1991).
254
1 1 U.S.C. Section 362(d)(3). For the definition of the "single asset real estate," see 1 1 U.S.C. Section
101(51B).
255 An analysis based upon 510 chapter 1 1 cases during the early 1990s in Los Angeles, California, shows
that 56% to 64% of the cases were filed primarily to protect real property from impending foreclosure. Lisa
Hill Fenning & Craig A. Hart, Measuring Chapter 11: The Real World of500 Cases, 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L.
Rev. 119, 120-22(1996).
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leading the case to termination, dismissal or conversion.
256
In a case of single asset real
estate, for example, if a secured creditor is granted relief from the stay and can continue
the foreclosure, the debtor will lose the merit of the case and will be ousted from the
process.
However, these remedies are easily circumvented by debtors. Debtors, in the case of a
dismissal or stay relief, can commence a new case, or in the case of dismissal with
prejudice, can convey all or a portion of the legal title of their assets to another person.
Then the different person can, in turn, file a new case. The debtor of the new case
automatically obtains the protection of the stay. Recognizing the limitations of the
remedies provided by the Code, various courts have developed "prospective relief or in
rem orders to prevent future abuse." These orders grant the creditor relief from the stay
and prospectively prohibit any parties from using the automatic stay." With respect to
future repeat filings, the Bankruptcy Review commission has recently proposed an
amendment to the Code to authorize the courts "to issue in rem orders that would bar the
application of a future automatic stay to identified property of the estate for a period up to
six years when a party could show that the debtor had transferred such real property ... to
avoid credit foreclosure or eviction."259
256 George G. Triantis, The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role of
Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, 16 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 101, 111 (1996).
57
Luis F. Chaves, In Rem Bankruptcy Refding Bars: Will They Stop Abuse of the Automatic Stay Against
Mortgages? 24 Cal. Bankr. J. 3, 5-6 (1998).
258
Id. at 6.
259
National Bankruptcy Review Commission Final Report, Consumer Bankruptcy Proposal No. 1. 5. 6., In
Rem Orders, at 281-87 (Oct. 1997). For pending bankruptcy legislation about in rem relief, see H.R. 3150
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3. Dismissal or Conversion under Section 1 1 12(b)
The bankruptcy court may convert a reorganization case to a Chapter 7 case or
dismiss a case for "cause."
260
Section 1 1 12(b) of the Code enumerates ten grounds for
such conversion or dismissal. The listed ten grounds are not exclusive. They are only
examples of the "cause." The Code, however, does not provide a definition of the term
"cause." According to the doctrine developed by case law soon after Congress enacted the
Code, lack of good faith on the part of the debtor constitutes the "cause." Lack of good
faith, that is, bad faith, means that the reorganization case is futile or filed in subjective
bad faith. The lists in Section 1 1 12(b) also involve both the futility and bad faith of the
debtor. Consequently, it has been said that "good faith ... is an implicit prerequisite to
the filing or continuation of a proceeding under Chapter 1 1 of the Code."
The problem with Section 1 1 12(b) is that this section's debtor screening role arises
too late and is therefore inefficient. For example, the creditors entitled to raise the same
issue both under Section 1 1 12(b) and 362(d) usually prefer to raise the issue by a motion
to lift the stay. The law governing a motion to lift the stay favors an early determination
of the reorganizability of the debtor, while a motion to dismiss or convert a case
discourages an early determination.
& Mary Davies Scott, Pending Bankruptcy Legislation: More to Follow??, SC 78 ALI-ABA 415, 420
(1998) (The National Bankruptcy Conference Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 3150).
260 11U.S.C. Section 1 1 12(b) (1994).
261
See, e.g., Sezter v. Hot Prods. (In re Sezter), 47 B.R. 340, 344 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1985).
262
In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549, 558 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 1981).
263
In order to constitute grounds for dismissal or conversion under Section 1 1 12(b)(1), for example, the
loss must be "continuing," and the delay must be "unreasonable." In addition, the provision requiring
"denial or confirmation of every proposed plan and denial of a request made for additional time for filing
another plan or a modification of a plan," Bankruptcy Code Section 1 1 12(b)(5), suggests that the debtor
will be given every opportunity to reorganize before the case is dismissed or converted.
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4. Dismissal Pursuant to Section 105
Several bankruptcy courts have used their equitable power under Section 105 of the
Code to dismiss a case with prejudice in order to prohibit commencement of a new case
within a specified period of time.
264 Some courts have used this power to protect the
courts' integrity by dismissing a case with prejudice, overriding other sections of the
Code that appear to set limits on the effect of dismissal. Courts dismissing a case by
using Section 105 have used Section 1 1 12(b) in conjunction with that section. By and
large, Section 105 has been used as a supplemental authority to other provisions such as
Section 362(d)267 and 1 1 12(b) of the Code. 268
5. Timing of Screening
Screening or filtering of debtors should occur as early as possible in the
reorganization process to reduce costs and save time. However, in reality, it takes place at
any time throughout the reorganization process before the court confirms the plan. As a
result, most cases that will fail in the end continue the costly procedure for a long time.
Moreover, the courts are "extremely hesitant to either terminate the reorganization
attempt or permit creditors to remove significant assets from the debtor."269 In most
cases, the courts protect the debtor's exclusive right to file a plan for at least 120 days
2M
In re Earl, 140 B.R. 728, 741 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992).
265
Chaves, supra note 257, at 9.
266
Id. at 10.
267
See, e.g., In re Geller, 96 B.R. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (The court awarded sanctions for abusive filings,
putting a limitation on future filings altogether for 6 months and requiring the court's permission for a
future filing for 2 years).
268
Section 105 of the Code has been used to invoke the court's equitable powers to allow limited payments
of pre-pefition debt under the "doctrine of necessity." Donald S. Bernstein & Regina E. Shannahan, An
Introduction to Chapter 11,511 PLI/Comm 7, 34 (1991).
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after the commencement of the case. The courts have routinely extended the exclusivity
period
270
without placing a considerable burden on the debtor to show that the business
has a going concern worth saving.
271 The average time spent on Chapter 1 1 cases appears
to be between 18 and 21 months, and fewer than a third of the plans are confirmed within
272
a year.
C. Comparison with the Bankruptcy Law of Canada
This problem of inefficiency in screening debtors not deserving reorganization efforts
arises because of the courts' attitude toward the reorganization rather than from the
provisions of the Code. For example, the implied threshold requirement of good faith
filing and Section 1 1 12(b) and 105 of the Code provide the courts a wide range of
discretion. If the courts appropriately exercise their discretion granted by the Code,
debtors not eligible for reorganization will be filtered out from the process in time. In this
regard, Canadian bankruptcy law and its practices provide important insights on the
reorganization system and practices of the United States. For example, the debtor
screening mechanisms of Canadian law suggest an important solution to the prosecution
of Chapter 1 1 of the Code.
69 George G. Triantis, The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role of
Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, 16 Int'l Rev. of L. & Econ. 101, 103 (1996).
270
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 121(d) (1994).
271
272
Triantis, supra note 269, at 103.
Id.; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter II, Wis. L. Rev. 729, 732-39 (1993).
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1 . Threshold Screening
The Canadian system examines the debtor's eligibility for reorganization at the very
early stage of the process. Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) of
Canada,274 in order for the debtor to have the opportunity to reorganize, the debtor must
show that it is viable or otherwise eligible for reorganization immediately after or at the
time of filing. The court holds an ex parte hearing upon filing and makes a preliminary
determination on the debtor's eligibility for reorganization, including viability. If the
debtor is recognized to be eligible for rehabilitation, the court enters an order granting the
application and staying the collection activity of the creditors. A case under the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA)275 may be initiated by the filing of a proposal, or,
as is much more common, by the filing of a notice of intention to make a proposal. 276 The
notice of the filing is sent to creditors within five days. Creditors then may move to
terminate the case on the grounds that the debtor is not eligible for reorganization. 277 The
grounds can be abuse of the stay or non-viability of the debtor. In addition, under the
BIA, the debtor must retain a licensed trustee, who has a continuing obligation during the
case to report on the financial condition and prospects of the debtor. 278 If there is no
possibility of successful reorganization, the trustee will probably refuse to be hired. The
trustee's refusal also functions as a means of debtor screening. After the notice of
273 Canada has two statutory regimes for the formal reorganization of insolvent companies: the Companies'
Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).
R.S.C. ch. C-25 (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter CCAA]. The CCAA is used primarily for the reorganization
of larger debtors with complicated capital structures, while the BIA is a less expensive alternative for
smaller debtors with less complicated capital structures.
275
R.S.C, ch. B-3 (1985) (Can.), amended by ch. 27, 1992 S.C. (Can.), which came into force on Nov. 30,
1992) [hereinafter BIA].
276
Jacob S. Ziegel, Canada's Phased-in Bankruptcy Law Reform, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 383, 392 (1996).
77
Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian
Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 Harv. Int'l L.J. 267, 285 (1994).
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proposal, the debtor must file a projected cash flow statement together with the trustee's
279
report certifying the reasonableness of that statement.
2. Information Disclosure
Under both the CCAA and BIA, because of the threshold screening mechanism
mentioned above, not only the court but also the creditors, at the inception of the case,
can get needed information about the financial and economic conditions of the debtor. 28
The information helps the court and creditors correctly evaluate the debtor's business. In
addition, the creditors can use such relatively credible information
281 during the
negotiation. On the other hand, the debtor's management consequently has the incentive
to provide early in the reorganization stage as much credible information about its
business as possible, including the information that has caused the financial distress. 282
This early-acquired information plays another role in successful reorganization in Canada.
It subsequently improves the efficiency of a liquidation auction by removing the
advantages the managers may have and reducing uncertainty over the value of the
283
company.
278
Id.
m
ld.
280 Under the Code, the creditors usually obtain the financial information of the debtor through the
disclosure statement submitted by the DIP. For the debtor's strategies regarding the disclosure statement,
see Glenn W. Merrick, The Chapter 11 Disclosure Statement in a Strategic Environment, 44 Business
Lawyer 103(1988).
281 By contrast, in the United States system the financial information prepared by the DIP for creditors is
frequently unreliable. Scott Peltz, Financial Information-Sticking to the Basics, 13-Nov Am. Bankr. Inst. J.
15, 15(1994).
282
Triantis, supra note 269, at 111.
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3. Termination of a Case
The Canadian bankruptcy courts are more flexible and active in terminating a pending
case. In both the United States and Canadian regimes, there are debtor monitoring
systems that often lead a pending case to termination. Once the court has noticed that
the case is inappropriate for reorganization, the court may terminate the formal
reorganization efforts or convert the case to a liquidation proceeding. The laws of both
countries focus on the same four factors: (1) whether the debtor is acting in good faith;
28
(2) whether the case is proceeding quickly enough;
287
(3) whether the debtor has the
capacity to reorganize;
288
and (4) whether the debtor's act in question is prejudicial to
creditors.
289
In both countries, the bankruptcy courts have considerable discretion in
determining both how to combine such factors to terminate the reorganization effort and
what kinds of circumstances warrant such termination. Despite such similarities of factors
leading to termination of a case, there appear to be substantial differences in the judicial
attitudes of both countries. Unlike the Code, the Canadian system routinely brings cases
before the court for evaluation and possible termination even without a formal move on
the part of the creditors.
290 Under the CCAA, for example, the court's initial order
specifies the time, typically a few months, within which the debtor must propose a
283
Id.
284
LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 277, at 31 1.
285
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 1 12(b) (1994); BAI Section 50.4(1 1) (Can.).
286
E.g., 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 1 12(b); BIA Section 50.4(9) and (1 1) (Can.)
287
E.g. 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 1 12(b)(3). Under the BIA (Can.), lack of "good faith" or "due diligence" are
grounds for refusing to extend the time for filing a proposal, BIA Section50.4(9), or for terminating the time
for filing a proposal, BIA Section 50.4(1 1).
288
E.g. 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 1 12(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), and (7); BIA Section 50.4(9), (11) (Can).
289
E.g. 11 U.S.C. Section 1 1 12(b)(1), (3); BIA Section 50.4(1 1) (Can).
290
LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 277, at 314.
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plan." The automatic stay is given for only that period." " To continue in reorganization
beyond that period, the debtor must present a plan or apply to the court for extensions at
intervals not longer than forty-five days. While considering the application for extension,
the CCAA court can check the debtor's eligibility again. The bases for the extension are
the four factors described above. 293
291
Id.
292
Id.
29i
Id
Chapter IV
Trustee and Examiner
A. The Need for a Trustee or an Examiner
When Congress consolidated Chapter X (Corporate Reorganization), Chapter XI
(Arrangements), and Chapter XII (Real Property Arrangements) of the Bankruptcy Act
(Act)294 into a unified reorganization chapter of the Code, 295 it presumed that pre-
bankruptcy management would continue to operate the business following the filing for
relief. Congress then also recognized the need for displacing the dishonest or grossly
incompetent DIP by creating a mechanism by which interested parties could seek the
appointment of a trustee. 296 If, as is often the case, the managers of a debtor are so
untrustworthy that the reorganization case is unlikely to succeed, it would be desirable to
oust the managers from the management. On this occasion, the appointment of a trustee is
proper because the debtor itself is economically viable. On the other hand, there are some
instances in which the current management needs to be retained even though some
activities of the management are problematic. For these occasions, the appointment of an
examiner is provided by the Code.
If a trustee is appointed, it can often solve problems associated with the DIP construct
of the Code. First, when the debtor has engaged in fraud or has incompetently managed
294
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840
(1938) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549).
295
Chapter 1 1 of the Code, Pub. L. No. 95-598.
59
60
the business, for example, a trustee can honestly and effectively investigate the prior
managers' conduct and can take over the management of the business." Second, even
when the debtor does not have such problems, a trustee may be able to soothe the possible
tensions between the current management and creditors. 298 Third, a trustee also can more
convincingly resolve issues regarding the corporate governance and the fiduciary duty of
the DIP, because the trustee is not elected by the shareholders and has no special relations
with the various constituencies. 299 The benefits of the appointment of a trustee result from
the fact that a trustee is an independent third party who is relatively familiar with
reorganization cases.
The appointment of an examiner is also beneficial in some instances. An examiner
can help in determining early in a case whether there is any meaningful chance that the
debtor can emerge from the financial difficulties. An independent, impartial examination
may have more credibility than an investigation by a committee, which likely has an
interest in the conclusions reached after the investigation. An examiner may provide other
benefits available from the intervention of an independent third party without incurring as
much cost as a trustee does. An examiner also can help diffuse possible tensions among
the various constituencies by performing its tasks independently.
296
See 11 U.S.C. Section 1 104(a) (1994).
97
Barry L. Zaretsky, Symposium on Bankruptcy: Chapter 11 Issues: Trustees and Examiners in Chapter
11, 44 S.C. L.Rev. 907,' 933 (1993).
298
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299
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B. Appointment of a Trustee or an Examiner
The United States Trustee and any party in interest may request the court to order the
appointment of a trustee or an examiner at any time after the commencement of a case but
before the confirmation of a plan.
300
If the court orders such an appointment, the United
States Trustee shall appoint the trustee or examiner, "after consultation with parties in
interest."
301 The appointment is subject to the court's approval. However, there is neither
a statute nor a legislative history that defines the scope of the court's discretion regarding
the approval.
302
1 . Trustee Appointment
There are two instances where the court can order the appointment of a trustee: where
the "for cause" standard is satisfied and where the "best interest" standard is satisfied.
Pursuant to section 1 104(a)(1), a party in interest or the United States trustee may seek
the appointment of a trustee "for cause," including "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or
gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or
after the commencement of the case."303 The grounds listed in section 1 104(a)(1) are not
exclusive,
304
but it is arguable that the "cause" includes some of the grounds listed in
section 1 1 12(b) of the Code. Among the nonexclusive ten factors enumerated in section
1 1 12(b),
305 from (1) to (5) and (10) provide an arguable basis for seeking the appointment
300
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 104(a) & (b) (1994).
301
Id. Section 1104(c).
302
Hon. Susan Pierson DeWitt, Trustees, Interim Trustees, United States Trustee: Powers and Duties, 490
PLI/Comm7, 14(1989).
303
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 104(a)(1) (1994).
304
According to the rules of construction, the words "includes" and "including" are not limiting. See 1
1
U.S.C. Section 102(3) (1994).
305 See id. Section 1 1 12(b) (1994).
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of a trustee.
306 The courts are in agreement that the time frame in which the court can
review current management's actions embraces activities both before and after the
commencement of the case.
The particular kinds of conduct that have been found to satisfy the "for cause"
standard include: inadequate accounting records and controls;
308
failure to obtain proper
insurance either for the employees or for its property;
309
commingling of assets; 310
conflicts of interest; 3 " failure to pay tax;
312
fraud;
313
and dishonesty. 314 The courts have
also ordered the appointment of a trustee where the current management failed to garner
the confidence of major secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and prospective buyers. 315
306
See, e.g.. In re Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 22 Bankr. 668, 671 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (The
bankruptcy court ordered the appointment of a trustee after the debtor in possession experienced continuing
and unexplained losses following the filing for relief).
307 See e.g., In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr. 51 1, 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982); In re Mam Line
Motors, Inc., 9 Bankr. 782, 784-85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
308
See, e.g., In re Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 585 (D.D.C. 1983) (lack of adequate accounting controls of a cash
business); In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr. 511,516 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982) (basic failure to
grasp the elements of financial controls).
See, e.g., In re Brown, supra note 308, at 585; In re Caroline Desert Disco, Inc., 5 Bankr. 536, 537
(Bankr. CD. Cal. 1980) (failure to maintain necessary casualty, public liability and worker's compensation
insurance).
310
See, e.g., In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 20 Bankr. 328, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (taking money out
of the debtor corporation's funds for personal use by the owner); In re Ford, 36 Bankr. 501 , 504-05 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1983) (postpetition sale and commingling of the assets without court's approval).
311
See, e.g.. In re L. S. Good & Co., 8 Bankr. 312, 315 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1980) (stating that "the
magnitude of the number of inter-company transactions places current management ... in a position of
having grave potential conflicts of interest and ... the current management will be unable to make the
impartial investigations and decisions demanded in evaluating and pursuing inter-company claims.
. .
.");
Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)
(commingling of the affairs of the debtor in possession and a related corporation).
312
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 308, at 585 (repeated failure to pay real estate taxes, resulting in additional
penalties); In re Great N.E. Lumber & Millwork Corp., 20 Bankr. 610, 61 1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (failure
to file and pay sales tax).
313
See, e.g., Hassett v. McColley (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 16 Bankr. 932, 935 (Bankr. S.D. NY.
1982) (including lending institutions in fraud to purchase notes secured by fictitious and falsified leases and
related financial documents); In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781, 784 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982)
(fraudulent activity designed to frustrate secured party's effort to enforce judgment).
314
See, e.g., In re Deena Packaging Indus., Inc., 29 Bankr. 705, 707-08 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983) (failure to
disclose relevant financial information in schedules); La Sherene, supra note 31 1, at 175-76 (general
dishonesty exemplified by desperate conduct in desperate situations).
315
See, e.g., In re Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 585 (D. D.C. 1983) (an instance where the debtor's litigious
personality dissuaded interested parties from closing on sale or lease of the debtor's property); Smith v.
63
In addition, the appointment of a trustee has been ordered where the debtor in possession
either has failed to pay to a secured party
316
or has made unauthorized payments
including, for example, payments on account of prepetition indebtedness.
"There are few situations which come to mind where grounds will exist for the
appointment of a trustee under subsection (a)(2) where 'cause' for such appointment will
not exist under subsection (a)(1)"318 because the difference between the two subsections
results from a difference in point of view. While the former is understood from the
perspective of potential problems stemming from current management, the latter is
viewed from the perspective of other parties that can be damaged by the conduct of the
management. Thus, the same activity of the management will usually satisfy the two
standards at the same time. The courts' decisions that have applied either of the two
standards would not, therefore, mean that the standard applied is exclusive. Indeed, it is
not uncommon to find that courts' decisions ordering the appointment of a trustee rest
upon both the "for cause" and the "best interests" standards at the same time. 319 Some
courts, however, have ordered the appointment of a trustee only under the "best interests"
standard to investigate whether reorganization is possible. 320 Some other courts have
ordered the appointment of a trustee, for cause, where the debtor in possession failed to
Concord Coal Corp. (In re Concord Coal Corp.), 1 1 Bankr. 552, 555 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va. 1981) (highly
unlikely that the debtor could gain and maintain confidence of secured lenders); Dardarian v. La Sherene.
Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (the debtor lacked managerial and
operational credibility, which threatened relationships with essential suppliers).
316
See, e.g.. In re McCall, 34 Bankr. 68, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (the debtor's failure to make monthly
payments for two years constituted gross mismanagement or incompetence).
317
See, e.g.. In re Eastern Consol. Utils., Inc., 3 Bankr. 591, 592 n. 3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
318
5 Collier on Bankruptcy % 1104. 01, at 1 104-22 to 23 (15
th
ed. 1982).
319
Robert J. Berdan & Bruce G. Arnold, Displacing the Debtor in Possession: The Requisites for and
Advantages of the Appointment of a Trustee in Chapter II Proceedings, 67 Marq. L. Rev. 457, 482 (1984).
320
See, e.g., Hotel Assocs., Inc. v. Trustees of Cent. States S.E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund (In re Hotel
Assocs., Inc.), 3 Bankr. 343, 346 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
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maintain the confidence of the secured parties;
21
where the debtor was confined in
prison; and where the individual debtor died after the case had commenced. " The
bankruptcy courts have placed the burden of proof for the appointment of a trustee on the
party moving for a trustee and have repeatedly ruled that the movant must prove the need
for a trustee by "clear and convincing evidence." 324
The courts, however, have been reluctant to order the appointment of a trustee under
the "best interests" standard in marginal cases. For example, the courts have declined to
order appointment of a trustee where current management had a needed expertise in a
complex industry or where it was unclear whether a trustee was more likely to
successfully rehabilitate the debtor than the DIP. Similarly, the courts have sometimes
declined to order the appointment of a trustee where the intermediate option of appointing
an examiner under section 1 104(b) proved to be more acceptable.
2. Examiner Appointment
According to Section 1 104(c) of the Code, if the court does not order the appointment
of a trustee, it "shall order the appointment of an examiner to conduct such an
investigation of the debtor . . . ."326 The statutory standard, "the interests of creditors, any
21
See, e.g.. Smith v. Concord Coal Corp. (In re Concord Coal Corp.), 1 1 Bankr. 552, 554 (Bankr. S.D. W.
Va. 1981).
322
See, e.g., In re New Haven Radio, Inc., 23 Bankr. 762, 767 (S.D. N.Y. 1982).
323
See, e.g., In re Smith, 6 Bankr. 641, 643 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
324
See, e.g., In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1226 (3rd Cir. 1989). See also Leonard L. Gumport,
The Bankruptcy Examiner, 20 Cal. Bankr. J. 71, 106 (1992).
325
See, e.g., In re Hamiel & Sons, Inc., 20 Bankr. 830, 832-33 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (because of the
costs of a trustee and the fact that the estate was not depleted, the court decided to order the appointment of
an examiner to investigate the potential liabilities of principal officers and shareholders under alter ego
doctrine); In re American Bulk Transport Co., 8 Bankr. 337, 340-41 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (a trustee would
not be needed, although it would be in 'best interests' of creditors to appoint an examiner).
326
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 104(c) (1994).
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equity security holders, and other interests of the estate,"
3 7
mirrors the standard for the
appointment of a trustee. The movant must prove the need for the appointment of an
examiner by clear and convincing evidence. 328 The collective interest of all of the
constituencies should be considered in the appointment of an examiner. Among such
interests, the interest of the estate is the primary concern. Like the standard for trustee
appointment, this standard also requires a comparison of the costs and the benefits of an
examiner appointment. The costs of an examiner are generally significantly lower than
those of a trustee because an examiner does not manage the business and therefore does
not need to be compensated for a management role.
C. Roles of Trustees and Examiners
The statutory language of Section 1 104(a)(1) and (c) suggests that the appointed
trustee or examiner should first investigate allegations of fraud, dishonesty,
incompetence, and so on. An independent third party is often well suited to investigate
issues regarding the conduct of the DIP and to provide an impartial, credible report. 330 An
impartial report helps the interested parties resolve disputed issues and reach an
agreement on a reorganization plan by bringing to light facts and issues of concern to the
327
Id.
328
Leonard L. Gumport, The Bankruptcy Examiner, 20 Cal. Bankr. J. 71, 106 (1992).
"9 A few courts have granted examiners the authority to run the business or otherwise to control the
reorganization. E.g., In re John Peterson Motors, Inc., 47 B.R. 551 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Liberal
Market, Inc., 1 1 B.R. 742 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio. 1981). Even though an examiner, except to the extent that the
court orders otherwise, performs the duties of a trustee, 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 106(a)(3) and (b), such duties
should be interpreted not to include the operation of the debtor's business under the DIP structure of the
Code. Section 1 106(b) authorizes an examiner to investigate and report, and to perform "any other duties of
the trustee that the court orders the debtor in possession not to perform."
330
Zaretsky, supra note 297, at 946.
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parties.
331 Such investigation by a trustee or an examiner can reach not only the debtor's
current business but also its management before the commencement of the case. " The
investigative function of a third party is particularly important in smaller cases because, in
a smaller case, there may not be an active creditors' committee and professionals who can
help supervise the DIP.
When there is substantial evidence that the DIP has been involved in fraud, gross
mismanagement, or other conduct inconsistent with its role as fiduciary for the estate, the
appointment of a third party is mandatory. 333 In Chapter 1 1 cases, creditors and
shareholders have a strong interest in the operation of the business of the debtor and in
the honest formulation of a reorganization or liquidation plan. If the DIP is engaged in
fraud or gross mismanagement, it cannot provide its various constituencies with comfort
and confidence. As a result, the negotiation process will likely come to a deadlock leading
the case to failure. Appointment of a trustee can be the proper solution to such a problem.
In particular, if there are conflicts of interest, the need for an independent third party
increases. In a reorganization case, there is considerable potential for conflicts of interest.
The managers of the DIP may be the beneficiaries of avoidable transfers or may otherwise
be in a position to benefit at the expense of the estate. Members of the creditors'
committee may also have in mind their own interests. The debtor may have affiliates with
whom it deals on unfair terms. When the appearance or fact of conflict becomes an issue,
the intervention of a third party may alleviate such difficulties. In addition, a trustee can
331
Id.
12
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 104(a)(c) (1994).
333
Id. See also, e.g., In re U.S. Communications of Westchester, Inc., 123 B.R. 491, 495 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.
1991).
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often pursue litigation on behalf of the estate more effectively than the DIP or a creditors'
committee.
The advantages associated with the appointment of a third party often outweigh the
drawbacks that undeniably exist in such appointment.
334 A trustee will seek to benefit all
the creditors and will bring a refreshing air of objectivity and impartiality to a business.
Specifically, the trustee will probably keep accurate and trustworthy records and try to
cooperate with the creditors in the pursuit of a plan. In addition, the trustee's objective
management of the business may make it possible to cut off loyalties to favored suppliers,
customers, or employees and sell off unprofitable or marginal divisions or product lines.
The trustee, through objective management, can also reduce the overhead by cutting off
inefficiencies, wastes, and excesses, thereby garnering the confidence in the creditors and
equity shareholders. The appointment of a third party may also prove to be particularly
advantageous in cases where the court has an opportunity to appoint an individual or firm
with unique expertise or to counterbalance an otherwise ineffective creditors'
committee. 336 Most importantly, the trustee may be more experienced than the current
management in dealing with the complexity of the reorganization process,337 thereby
maximizing the chances of a successful reorganization for the benefit of all parties to the
proceeding.
334 The expenses related to a trustee, the trustee's being unfamiliar with the business, and the possibility of
discouraging the debtor from filing for relief would be some of the disadvantages. See generally A & P H.
R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95 th Cong., I s ' Sess. (1977) at 233.
35
LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?
(Second Installment), 57 Am Bankr. L. J. 247, 257 (1983).
336
Id. at 249.
37
In some bankruptcy districts, such as Columbus, Ohio, and San Antonio, Texas, Chapter 13 standing
trustees run extensive credit-education, counseling, and re-establishment programs for consumer debtors.
These programs might increase the rate of successful reorganization. Jean Braucher, Bankruptcy
Reorganization and Economic Development, 23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 499, 499 (1994) n. 2.
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The court can limit the roles of a trustee in operating the debtor's business. In other
words, a trustee may completely replace the management of the DIP or may be assigned a
more limited role. If the court deems that the current management is important to the
ongoing business operations, it can order the trustee to serve only an oversight role,
retaining the current management for day-to-day operations. 338
Except for being unable to replace the operation of the debtor's day-to-day business,
an examiner performs the same duties as a trustee unless the court orders otherwise. 3
One of the distinctive roles of an examiner is that an examiner with expanded powers
may be appointed to mediate in deadlocked plan negotiations. 340 Mediation by an
examiner appears to be particularly useful when the period within which the DIP can
exclusively propose a reorganization plan has expired. 341 Once the exclusive period has
expired, any party can file a plan and attempt to obtain the agreement of other
constituencies.
342 Under this circumstance, an independent third party's plan is more
likely to obtain other parties agreement. 343
38
See, e.g.. In re Madison Management Group, 137 B.R. 275 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1992) (a trustee was
appointed to investigate causes of action available to the debtor and to pursue viable actions).
339
1 1U.S.C. Section 1 106(b) (1994).
340
See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co., 99 B.R. 177 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989)
341
Zaretsky, supra note 297, at 957.
342
1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 121(c) (1994).
343
Zaretsky, supra note 297, at 958.
Chapter V
Conclusion
When Congress promulgated Chapter 1 1 of the Code in 1978, it thought that the
operation of a business was best left to existing management. The current management
possesses the most familiarity with the business. Retention of existing management will
therefore enhance the effectiveness of the debtor's business operations and reduce the
cost of administration. Accordingly, the Code contemplates that the debtor will remain in
control of its business while negotiating the terms of a reorganization plan.
In order to support the efficacy of the debtor in possession concept, Congress created
several participants who would balance the conflicting interests of the debtor and its
creditors. The mandatory creditors' committee is one of them. The committee is designed
to oversee, monitor, and investigate the business operation by the debtor in possession
and to negotiate a plan. If the committee is not enough to protect creditors' interests, the
bankruptcy court may order the appointment of an independent third party, a trustee or an
examiner. A trustee or an examiner investigates not only the conduct of the existing
management but also the debtor's economic and financial situations. The third party is
expected to restore the confidence of other parties in interest by impartial investigation
and objective evaluation of the debtor. The United States Trustee also plays a supervisory
role along with its case administration function. The bankruptcy courts' equity power is
69
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one of the most influential methods controlling the conduct of the debtor in possession
even though the courts' role is principally limited to the judicial function.
However, the realities of bankruptcy practice have proved to be different from what
Congress contemplated. Despite Congress's original intention, both the creditors'
committee and the appointment of a third party have not functioned well. Creditors are
often apathetic to the reorganization process. Moreover, in many small cases, the
creditors' committee does not even exist. The appointment of a third party is rare because
the courts regard the appointment of a trustee or an examiner as an extraordinary remedy.
Absent extraordinary circumstances, the courts consider that such an appointment is
counterproductive and against the policies underlying the DIP construct of the Code. As a
result, in the majority of cases the DIP can enjoy its exclusivity for at least 120 days from
the inception of the case without much intervention. Moreover, the exclusive period can
be extended easily. The courts' deep-rooted respect for the DIP concept gives many
incentives to a debtor to file for reorganization relief even though the debtor does not
have a going concern value. The result is that after a lengthy and expensive reorganization
effort, the case still fails. Empirical studies show that less than 30 percent of the Chapter
1 1 cases have managed to get a confirmed plan and that about half of the debtors whose
plans have been confirmed have again experienced financial difficulties.
One of the important factors contributing to such unsuccessful reorganizations has
been that businesses not eligible for reorganization efforts nonetheless attempt to
reorganize. Debtors without going concern value and those that abuse the automatic stay
do not deserve rehabilitation efforts. If a reorganization case fails, considerable costs
remain without any desirable outcome. The costs are borne by the creditors, and in the
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long run society as a whole shares them. Unlike successful business rehabilitation, a
failing case has no ground to justify such expenses. The costs incurred by debtors not
deserving reorganization cannot be justified even though the presupposed "possible
misuse of resources"344 is taken into account.
The thesis suggests that bankruptcy courts more actively manage reorganization cases
in order to reduce the costs incurred by the filings of ineligible debtors. Provided that the
courts adequately utilize the existing legal devices established under the Code, the costs
would be reduced dramatically. First, the court can use the threshold requirement of good
faith filing. This requirement has been developed by some courts to prevent abusive or
non-viable debtors from taking advantage of the reorganization relief. Second, the court
can utilize Section 1 1 12(b) (conversion or dismissal) and Section 362(d) (relief from the
stay). These sections can help terminate some pending cases on the grounds of abuse or
futility of the case. Third, the appointment of a trustee or an examiner should be used
more frequently. Section 1 104 of the Code provides some circumstances under which the
appointment of a trustee or an examiner is mandatory. Fourth and most importantly, the
utilization of Section 105 of the Code is a useful method to expedite reorganization cases.
Under this section, the courts may take any action and may make any determination
necessary to enforce a court order or rule to prevent an abuse of the process on a sua
sponte basis. Many courts are now using Section 105 as a ground for creating new
methods that would help them administer a case more efficiently and expeditiously.
Mediation based on Section 105 is a good example.
344
N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).
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There are many provisions and doctrines that suggest the courts participate in the
reorganization process more actively to protect creditors' rights. Nevertheless, the courts
are extremely reluctant to get out of their deep-rooted respect for the debtor in possession
construct of the Code. Compared to the bankruptcy practice of Canada, that of the United
States overprotects the debtors at the expense of the creditors.
Such lukewarm attitudes of the courts may result from a fear that a premature
decision would cause mistakes. In most cases, because the DIP is aware of the courts'
attitudes, it submits information regarding its business as late as possible. Then the
courts, for example, can use Section 105(d) of the Code to order the DIP to file the
disclosure statement before a plan is ready. It is possible and necessary for the courts to
make the DIP reveal its financial and economic realities at the early stage of the process
because the debtor's managers may have been preparing for bankruptcy for a long time
before they finally file the petition. If credible financial information of the debtor comes
to the creditors immediately after the filing, a substantial portion of debtors not worth
saving would be kept out of the reorganization process, as shown in the bankruptcy
practice of Canada. The bankruptcy courts of the United States should more actively
administer reorganization cases. No one believes in preserving businesses destined to fail,
and a debtor that abuses the rehabilitation scheme does not deserve to be called an honest
debtor eligible for survival.
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